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ABSTRACT
Laslovich, Michael Joseph, M.A., Fall 1978
The Parti Québécois and Quebec Separatism

Political Science
(113 pp.)

Director: Thomas Payne
Within the Canadian federation exists the predominately Frenchspeaking province of Quebec. After more than one hundred years of
membership within the Canadian federation, the Parti Québécois, the
ruling party, is now calling for the political independence of
Quebec. I t feels that only through political independence can i t
ensure the continued survival and prosperity of Quebec's French cul
ture. Continued membership in the Canadian federation, according to
the Parti Québécois, would result in the assimilation of French
Canadians into the English Canadian way of life.
The purpose of this study is to analyze the Parti Québécois's
efforts to achieve political independence for the Canadian province
of Quebec. The work includes a look at the history of the FrenchCanadian separatist movement, the development of the Parti Québécois
along with its program, and an analysis of the potential for success
of the separatist movement. This analysis of the Parti Québécois is
based upon a general survey of existing literature and documents
addressing this topic. Public opinion surveys, election analyses,
party programs, and other relevant works are utilized.
Because of the current nature of the problem, a definitive predic
tion of the outcome is impossible. However, no matter what the out
come of the Parti Québécois's bid for independence, the Canadian
federation will not remain unchanged. I t is likely the central
government will become more decentralized in face of Quebec's de
mands .
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
On November 15, 1976, the voters of the Canadian
province of Quebec elevated the Parti Québécois to power,
and in so doing brought forward the issue of independence.
Although the phenomena of Quebec separatism is not new, its
resurgence has caused grave concern both within and outside
Canada.
The history of French and English Canadian relations
has been marked by suspicion, misunderstanding, and sometimes
even violence.

French Canadians, though, have managed to

maintain their culture in face of the assimilative pressures
of the English-dominated country.

Although French Canadians

have employed various strategies at different periods, their
primary goal has always been to preserve their French way of
life.
The French-speaking citizens of New France became sub
jects of Great Britain as a result of France's defeat by the
English in 1760.

Ever since that time French Canadians have

been concerned with the maintenance of their French language
and customs.
French Canadians were most concerned with retaining
as much freedom as possible to ensure the continuance of
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their life as it had been for almost two hundred years.

The

British government tried to attract English settlers into its
new colony by offering vacant lands free to ex-soldiers and
easy terms to others .

French Canadians did not favor the

idea of English settlers invading their homeland, nor were
English Canadians enthusiastic to venture to a land where
they might be denied the customary rights of Englishmen.

It

was precisely when French and English Canadians came into con
tact that trouble began because of their divergent customs.
English Canadians demanded that they receive their accustomed
rights.

Understandably, French Canadians interpreted almost

any action of their English conquerors as motivated by con
tempt, superiority, or malice towards them.

This unfortunate

heritage of misunderstanding is the heaviest cross that Canada
has had to bear and is one source of the current separatist
movement.
The British government sought to impose modified Eng
lish institutions upon its French subjects while granting
rights to the French Canadians in hopes of winning their
allegiance.

French Canadians took advantage of such rights

as elective assemblies, but only to the extent to protect
themselves.

They did not become active in national affairs

but instead preferred to remain isolated, using those rights
granted them by their English masters to protect themselves
from outside interference.

Ironically, measures designed to

capture French-Canadian support, such as the Act of Union of
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1840, were to later frustrate the wishes of English Canadians.
French Canadians, however, clung to those measures advantageous
to their cultural survival.
Contrary to the British government's expectations,
French Canadians managed to keep their culture intact, a cul^
ture which had developed almost two hundred years in North
America

before the English conquest.

Canada has always been

forced to recognize the French fact and still must today.
The nature of the French Canadian changed drastically
with the industrialization and urbanization of Quebec.

French

Canadians were no longer content only to utilize their pro
vincial government in a negative manner; that is, in fighting
off federal interference.

Instead, they began to make demands

upon their provincial government for positive action to ensure
not only the survival, but the growth of their culture.

As a

result, the provincial government of Quebec, beginning with
Jean Lesage in the early 1960s, made greater demands upon the
federal government for more extensive provincial power.
French Canadians no longer tolerated English domination
of Quebec business.

For many years French Canadians were dis

couraged by the Catholic Church to choose careers in business.
However, under the forces of modernization, the Catholic Church
lost its powerful influence over Quebecers.

Quebecers received

training in those areas which they had previously shunned.
Naturally, this new French Canadian middle class,made up of
highly skilled individuals, sought employment in their French-
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speaking province.

They were frustrated when they discovered

that many English-dominated companies which operated in Quebec
would not hire them to fill top job positions because of their
inability to speak English.

Thus, in their own province,

French Canadians were excluded from top positions because of
their language.

Although French Canadians realized that their

language was a handicap outside Quebec, where they comprised
a minority, they could not accept the idea that their language
should hinder them in Quebec where French-speaking citizens
comprised the majority.
One source of the current French Canadian dissatisfac
tion with the Canadian federation, therefore, is tied to
economic considerations.

French Quebecers resent that they

are discriminated against because of their language in their
own province.
This point is important to note: French Canadians are
largely concentrated in the province of Quebec.

This fact

has aided in the amazing survival of French-Canadian culture
in North America.

Many French Canadians say they only feel

at home in Quebec, that this province is their homeland.

As

a result, the fact that they should be discriminated against
because of their language is unacceptable.
Fears of cultural assimilation have combined with
economic considerations to make the option of political separa
tion more appealing to French-speaking Quebecers.
French Canadian is faced with a dilemma.

Today's

First and foremost.
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throughout his history

he has sought to maintain his culture.

Today's French Canadians, however, are a modern people who
want to develop fully to their potential.

The dilemma arises

from the fact that French-speaking individuals are being told
that their language is a handicap to advancement in an Englishdominated business world.
French Canadians want both.

They not only want to

advance economically, but they want to do it without the loss
of their French customs.

They do not want to grow economically

at the price of cultural assimilation.
Pierre Trudeau, in keeping with his belief in the
federalist solution, has tried to satisfy French Canadians
through a policy of bilingualism.

He has sought to make

French-speaking Quebecers at home within the Canadian federa
tion and not culturally threatened.

Trudeau's policy has

attracted criticism from both English and French Canadians.
Some English Canadians feel it is a wasted effort; French
Canadians should learn to speak English since it is the lan
guage of business in North America and of the vast majority
in Canada.

Many French Canadians, on the other hand, are

irritated by what they feel is an unfulfilled policy.

Still

other French Canadians feel that bilingualism is only
another attempt by English-speaking Canadians to assimilate
French Canadians by giving them a false sense of security
through the facade of bilingualism.
The political separation option for Quebec raises
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a whole host of other questions, not only concerning the
future of the Canadian federation, but also for the United
States and the rest of the world.

Among them are; "Can an

independent Quebec survive economically?," "Would the remain
ing Canadian federation remain intact?," "Is separation legal
according to the Canadian constitution?," and "What would be
the ramifications of political independence throughout the
world?"

The merits of independence for Quebecers is also

questionable.

Would political independence really make a

difference for the French-speaking members of Quebec, or would
it only entail greater hardships for them?
The question of political independence for Quebec is
thus very complicated.

The purpose of this work is to focus

on the Parti Québécois and its efforts to achieve independence
for Quebec, since a study of all variables would require an
enormous scope.

A detailed study of the cultural, economic

and world implications of Quebec independence must be left to
others.

This study includes a look at the history of the

separatist movement, the development of the Parti Québécois
from 1968 to 1976, the PQ program, and an analysis of the po
tential for success of the Parti Québécois.
This analysis of the Parti Québécois is based upon a
general survey of existing literature and documents addressing
this topic.

Public opinion surveys, election analyses, party

programs, and other works relevenat to the Parti Québécois in
its quest for political independence are utilized.
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Because o£ the complexity of the French-Canadian ques
tion, only the political aspect of this problem is addressed.
Hopefully others will find this work helpful in their attempts
to discern the reality of the French-Canadian problem.

The

solution of the French-Canadian issue of separatism is impor
tant not only for Canadians, but for the rest of the world.
Canada plays a major role in world affairs and any disruption
in its internal affairs would have profound effects upon the
world, especially the United States.

Thus it is important

that Americans understand the importance of French-Canadian
demands for independence.
Separatist Option

Central to the purpose of the Parti Québécois is the
issue of separation.

Why does this phenomena exist in Quebec?

According to one analysis:
The option of independence, usually called 'separatism'
in English, has always existed in Quebec. At times
expressed by isolated intellectuals, at times through
armed revolt, the independence movement took the form
of a group of intellectuals in the 1930's (Andre
Laurendeau, Jean-Louis Gagnon, etc.), then of a
series of political parties, for instance, the
Rassemblement pour 1'Independence Nationale and the
Ralliement National, both of which participated in
the general elections of June 5, 1966, and the Parti
Québécois, which'participated in the general elections
of April 29, 1970. Although the programs of these
movements and parties varied widely, they all con
tained one important element: the conviction that
there is a complete lack of harmony between an exist
ing - or emerging - society and the political and

8
other institutions which are - or should be - its
framework, its tools, its indispensable aids.l
The Parti Québécois contends that the institutions of
a society must serve a majority of its inhabitants, but that
under the current Canadian federal system the confrontation
between a permanent majority (Anglophone Canadians) and a
permanent minority (Francophone Canadians) makes the existing
institutions undesirable for the French majority in Quebec.
As Dr. Marcel Chaput, a prominent leader, states:
. . . no matter which way you look at it, we form
a powerless minority. You may say that the Quebec
ballots decide the [national] vote. It has been
true at times, but the 1957 elections put the lie
to that belief. From now on, a political party can
get itself into office at Ottawa and form a stable
government without having to cater to Quebec. For
this reason, 1957 is an important date in the his
tory of French Canada.2
Separatists are very pessimistic about their future in
the Canadian federation.

Although they have been able to main

tain their unique culture, French separatists believe that it
cannot be preserved under the continued association -with Eng
lish Canada.

René Levesque believes that, "For Quebec, in fact,

independence is a vital necessity; for Canada, Quebec's inde
pendence is the prerequisite to a fuller development.

For the

two states this would provide a new and fruitful start.

For we

Andre Laroque, "Political Institutions'and Quebec
Society," in Quebec Society and Politics: Views from the
Inside, ed. Dale C. Thomson (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart
Limited, 1973), pp. 75-76.
2

Marcel Chaput, Why I Am a Separatist (Toronto: The
Ryerson Press, 1961), p. 24.
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are a deadweight on English Canada, and we ourselves lead a
mutilated existence."^
The question, "What does Quebec want?" has been asked
by English Canadians throughout their association with their
French counterparts.

With the emergence of the Quiet Revolu

tion of the 1960s, Quebecers were no longer satisfied to re
main behind the negative nationalistic policies of their gov
ernment.

Quebecers now wanted their provincial government to

take an active part in protecting their way of life.

Pierre

Elliott Trudeau, then a law professor, thought that only
through an active role in Canadian affairs could Quebec's French
culture withstand the test against the English majority.

He

wrote, ". . . no constitutional reform - indeed not even a dec
laration of independence - could make French a majority language
of business and industry in North America, or make Quebec a
state capable of dictating its terms to the rest of the conti
nent.
Separatists, represented by the Parti Québécois, dis
agree with Trudeau's federal solution.

Today, according to one

historian, "... the Québécois want to preserve the French lan
guage and culture, to control immigration, to establish an inde
pendent foreign policy, and to secure all they can from Ottawa

^Rene LeVesque, An Option for Quebec (Toronto;
McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1968), p. 112.
^Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Federalism and the French
Canadians (Toronto: Macmillin of Canada, 1968), p. 8.
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now without relaxing the pressure for eventual separation."^
There seems to be no hope for accommodation short of separa
tion between Ottawa and Quebec in the view of Dr. Chaput: ,
"The removal of each individual injustice suffered by the
French-Canadians will not cause the idea of an independent
Quebec to disappear.
ferent reason.

We want independence for a totally dif

It is because dignity requires it.

It is be

cause of the idea that minorities, like absentees, are always
wrong.
Sovereignty is for the PQ an essential condition for
improving the collective life of the people of Quebec, who
have always perceived that they are different from the rest
of Canada, and have sought to maintain that difference.

Some

still argue for a special status for Quebec vis-a-vis the
other provinces, but the PQ insists that the other provinces
would not accept such an arrangement, and rightfully so.

In

the view of the PQ, independence offers much more, both to
English and French Canada.

As Rene Levesque stated:

The important thing for today and for tomorrow is
that both sides realize that this regime [the
Canadian Federation] has had its day and that is
a matter of urgency either to modify it profoundly
or to build a new one.
As we are the ones who have put up with its
main disadvantages, it is natural we also should
be in the greatest hurry to be rid of it; the more
c .
Kenneth M. Glazier, "Separatism and Quebec," Current
History, April 1977, p. 157.
^Chaput, op. cit., p. 5.
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so because it is we who are menaced most danger
ously by its current paralysis.?
Levesque believes federalism is only damaging

an ". . . ancient

hobble of a federalism suited to the last century . . ." leading
to a ". . . perpetual atmosphere of instability, of wrangling
over everything and over nothing.

It would mean the steriliza

tion of two collective 'personalities' which, having squandered
the most precious part of their potential, would weaken each
other so completely that they would have no other choice but to
draw themselves in the ample bosom of 'America'."

g

Yet anti-separatists feel just the opposite: that if
Quebec leaves Canada, other provinces may follow suit, leaving
the door open for the United States to absorb large areas of a
dismembered federation.

In their view, Quebec has played a

large part in preventing United States takeover of Canada.
Again, what does Quebec want?

According to Rene

Levesque, it first and foremost wishes to secure its "collective
personality:" French language, customs and practices-.

This can

only be achieved, the PQ asserts, by the complete mastery of
every last area of basic collective decision making.
must become sovereign as soon as possible.

Quebec

As a consequence,

". . .we finally would have without our grasp the security of
our collective 'being' which is so vital to us, a security
9
which otherwise must remain uncertain and incomplete."

Levesque, op. cit., p. 21.
^Ibid., p. 26.
^Ibid.

Also,
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in the process, English Canada would become free to develop,
following any path it chooses.
The Parti Québécois believes that separation is not
only necessary but inevitable, which has important consequences
as far as the PQ's conduct is concerned.

For example. Premier

Levesque has promised to hold a referendum on political inde
pendence.
dence?

What if Quebecers should refuse to support indepen

Mr. Levesque says he will try again, assuming that if

the people of Quebec are shown the merits of independence,
they will naturally opt out of the federation.

The PQ does not

question the fact that independence will happen--only when.
Language Assimilation

Because of the PQ's concern with securing its collective
existence, it is very concerned with preventing the forces of
assimilation.

One recent measure taken by the Parti Québécois

has caused a great uproar throughout Canada as well as within
Quebec; namely, the passage of Bill 101--the Official Language
Act.,

This Act requires children of immigrants, whose mother

tongue was not English, to attend French schools.

In defense

of this action, the PQ points to the rapid rate of assimila
tion of immigrants into the English culture.

Most immigrants

who come to Quebec send their children to English schools be
cause they believe this will be more beneficial when their
children enter the English-speaking dominated job market.
Between 1945 to 1967 inclusive, Canada accepted about three

13
million immigrants.^®

More than 35 percent, on the average,

were of Anglo-Saxon origin.
much less.

The total for the French was

(See Table 1.)

TABLE 1
CANADIAN IMMIGRATION
1966
Total Number of
Immigrants
Of English Origin
Of French Origin

1967

194,743

170,000

71,505 (37 percent)
6,675

(3 percent)

(9 months)

59 ,500 (35 percent)
10 ,000

(6 percent)

Source: Kenneth M. Glazier, "Separatism and Quebec," Current
History, April 1977, p. 157.

Of the thirty-five Canadian immigration offices, six
are in the United Kingdom and Ireland, five in Germany, and
four in the United States, while there had been only one in
France until Ottawa opened two new offices in 1966.
Furthermore, countries and areas of the world which
could provide excellent French-speaking applicants are com
pletely neglected; there are no offices in Latin America,
North Africa, in the Near East (except in Israel and Egypt),
or in the French-speaking areas of Asia.
A new agreement between the federal government and

^^Glazier, op. cit., p. 154.
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Quebec, signed February 20, 197 8, will improve Quebec's
ability to choose the immigrants who wish to settle in Quebec,
while respecting federal responsibilities for the admission
of immigrants to the rest of Canada.

The agreement allows

Quebec to establish its own system of points for admitting
immigrants.

Although this will be similar to the federal

government's system of points criteria, which is nationwide,
Quebec will be able to give extra weight to the ability of
prospective immigrants to speak French or to be absorbed into
the French-speaking community in Quebec.

The new accord

supersedes the one signed in October 197 5, under which Quebec
gave its advice on applications of immigrants destined to that
province, but had no decision-making powers.
There are other measures which make it possible to
give consideration to certain provincial priorities of
Quebec.

First are instructions to federal representatives

abroad, since the passage of the new act making French the
sole official language in Quebec (Bill 101), to advise immi
grants destined to Quebec of the francophone character of the
province and their obligation to learn French and send their
children to French schools.

Second, before an employment

visa is issued for Quebec, the province is consulted in order
to determine the social and cultural implications of admitting
temporary workers.

Finally, a number of federal programs de

signed to assist immigrant adjustments are also in line with
Quebec's priorities in this field.

In 1976 to 1977, Ottawa
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spent $5,125,000 on language courses for immigrants.

In

Quebec's immigration orientation centres, 3,675 immigrants
were given French courses during the year.^^
More recent figures on the percentage of Frenchspeaking citizens of Quebec contradict separatist claims
of rapid assimilation.

According to National Health and

Welfare Minister Monique Begin, the francophone majority in
Quebec, which rose by more than 200,000 from 1971 to 1976,
12
is now over five million.

In the same five years, the

anglophone and "other language" groups in Quebec have in
creased by barely 3,000 persons each, with the result that
Quebecers, whose mother tongue is French, account for more
than 30 percent of the population increase in the province
over the past five years.

Consequently, the French-speaking

majority in Quebec grew from 80.7 percent of the total popula
tion of Quebec in 1971 to 81.3 percent in 1976.
The results, according to Minister Begin, are:
The actual state of affairs, then contradicts the
separatist thesis but it does confirm that of the
francophone federalists. The French fact is a
solid and massive one, an irreversible one in
Quebec, but it is more fragile and its position
has not yet been consolidated in the other
regions of the country. In fact, the analysis
commissioned by the Federal Government from
Rejean Lachapelle of the Institut de recherches
politiques de Montreal indicates that the posi
tions of the francophone minorities in Ontario

^^"Francophone Immigration: A History of FederalProvincial Co-operation," Canada Weekly, 8 March 1978, p. 2.
12
"Quebec's French-speaking Majority on the Increase,"
Canada Weekly, 14 December 1977, p. 3.

16
and New Brunswick have weakened in the past five
years. In New Brunswick the population with
French as its mother tongue has dropped from 34
to 33.6 per cent of the total from 1971 to 1976.
In Ontario it has dropped from 6.3 to 5.7 per
cent.
These trends can hardly move one to be com
placent. There is most certainly a FrenchCanadian demographic problem, but it is in the
anglophone provinces, not in Quebec. The separa
tion of Quebec, in addition to meaning the set
ting in of demographic stagnation, would not re
solve this problem in the least, but on the con
trary, be absolutely catastrophic for the million
francophones living in other provinces.13
One of the major factors which precipitated the current
crisis in Quebec, according to one authority, is the belief
that the Québécois are an endangered species.

The birthrate in

Quebec has been declining since 1954, and the population of
Quebec increased in the period of 1971 to 1974 by only 7 percent
in natural increase (births over deaths), the lowest rate of any
province in Canada.However, as one historian wrote, "The
crisis of the cradle is a major force behind the rise of the
Parti Québécois and will not be solved, or even ameliorated,
by a change of government in Quebec.

With 300,000 unemployed

in Quebec in 1977, an increase in the birthrate is not a
priority need."^^

Middle-Class Support for Separation
According to some observers, Quebec's demands for

l^ibid., p. 154.
l^lbid., p. 155.
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separation are a result of a rising French-Canadian middle
class.

One political scientist states:

"Quebec nationalism

and separatism stem from the frustrations of young Frenchspeaking managerial and professional people, particularly in
Montreal, who wish to make their way in modern occupations
but find advancement not fully possible in English-Canadian
organizations."^^

Another political scientist offers what

he calls the "statue inconsistency hypothesis," which states:
. . . at some initial time, a dominant group A is
high on achieved and ascribed statuses, and a sub
ordinate group B is low on both. The mobility
rate is near zero; there is intragroup status
consistency and intergroup stability. At a later
time, as mobility opportunities increase, some
members of group B rise in achieved, but not as
cribed status. Though now less absolutely de
prived, they are more relatively deprived as
group A becomes the comparison reference. Politi
cal nationalism, as one of the ideologies that
legitimate conflict, arises when status inconsis
tent members of group B enter the power transition
interval.17
This middle class wants to bring Quebec fully into the urban,
industrial, scientific age, but they want this to be done in
French, according to French-Canadian values, in order to pro
tect the integrity of French culture in Quebec vis-a-vis the
rest of Canada.
During what has come to be known as the Quiet Revolu
tion, the Liberal party became the political expression of the

^^Erwin C. Hargrove, "Nationality, values, and change.
Young Elites in French Canada," Comparative Politics, April
1970, p. 474.
17

Wallace D. Lon, "Nationalist Attitudes in Quebec
and Belgium," Journal of Conflict Resolution, June 1975,
p. 221.
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new middle class, as witnessed by the bureaucratic revolu
tion under the forces of modernization.

It has been stated:

"Its election in 1960 publicly consecrated the political
dominance of the new middle classes in French-Canadian
society.
In the early 1960s, French Canadians had become dis
contented with the English dominance in Quebec.

The Lesage

government began a program calculated to realize the potential
of French Canada and to ensure the principle of "maîtres chez
nous."

The program included the nationalization of the eleven

power companies of Quebec and various educational reforms.
The Lesage government sought to improve the position of the
French Canadian within the framework of the Canadian federa
tion.

Its purpose was not only that French Canadians should

have more control over the Quebec economy, but also that the
French language should secure more recognition in the busi
ness life of the province.

The middle class sought to expand

its opportunities by opening new areas of employment that had
been denied to French Canadians because of their language.
In the view of separatists, total social development
for French Canada cannot be achieved because it lacks state
hood.

According to Dr. Chaput, "In the same way that complete

loss of autonomy leads to assimilation, complete possession of
1O

Hubert Guindon, "Two cultures: An essay on National
ism, Class, and Ethnic Tension," in Contemporary Canada, ed.
Richard H. Leach (Durham, N.C.; Duke University Press, 1967),
p. 46.
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autonomy, called independence, leads to the flowering of a
nation. . . . Quebec's independence will insure our advance
ment by handing over to us the control of our own destiny.
Separatists believe the restricted employment opportunities
of the middle class is a result of their lack of independence.
However, if Quebec is to achieve independence, the Parti
Québécois must enlist the support of other groups within
Quebec, such as the working class.
Pierre Trudeau, while accepting the view that this
new middle class is responsible for the Quebec separatist
movement, has a very different impression of its motives.
He states:
The truth is that the separatist counter-revolution
is the work of a powerless petit-bourgeois minority
afraid of being left behind by the twentiethcentury revolution. Rather than carving themselves
out a place in it by ability, they want to make the
whole tribe return to the wigwams by declaring its
independence. 20
Another observer writes that:
. , . the forces released by Quebec's social revo
lution cannot achieve results fast enough to keep
up with burgeoning demands. There must be, it is
felt, some way to create heaven-on-earth overnight.
Hostile forces must be at work hindering progress.
There emerges, therefore, an analysis which is a
melange of fact and frustration: the relationship
to English Canada is the barrier to Utopia; politi
cal independence will clear the way.21
l^Chaput, op. cit., p. 63.
20pierre Elliott Trudeau, "Separatist CounterRevolutionaries," Canadian Forum, October 1964, p. 78.
21
Michael Oliver, "Confederation and Quebec,"
Canadian Forum, October 1963, p. 180.

20
Those advocating federalism believe that Frenchspeaking Canadians can only maintain their identity by con
tinued association with the remainder of English Canada,
According to one political scientist: "One day Quebec will
understand that it is only in profiting from all the pos
sibilities of democracy that it will cease to be a permanent
minority in order to become a minority which, in association
with other minorities, will be able on particular questions
to become a majority."
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Federalists argue that no matter

how French Canadians change their political structure, not
even a declaration of independence, will change the fact
that French Canadians will always constitute a minority in
an English-dominated continent.

They warn French Canadians

that separation from Canada will not act as a panacea, but
in fact will cause French Canadians needless economic harm.
The Quiet Revolution has, in the view of many ob
servers, set into motion a process that might result in the
independence of Quebec.

When French merchants and bankers

went back to France after the English takeover of French
Canada, they left the French with no one to manage their
businesses.

English bourgeoisie moved in and built up Quebec

trade and banking.

Today, a French bourgeoisie has come into

existence composed of a modern complex form of executives and
technicians who will no longer accept English domination.
22

Leon Dion, "The Origin and Character of the Nation
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The process of urbanization and development of a
modern economy in Quebec, which has done more than anything
else to undermine the older form of nationalism, i.e.,
isolationism, has created the pressures which lie behind
the current independence movement of the Parti Québécois.
One political scientist writes:
Cases of conscious discrimination may be few, but
there is inevitable unconscious discrimination
since the ways in which the French employee ex
presses himself are often little understood by
the English-Canadian superior. The predicament
is therefore harmful or thought to be harmful
to French Canadians' chances for promotion. And
since the entering of a modern economy brings
along with it the ambition to succeed and the
normal expectations of rising, it can be a
dramatic experience for a certain group if on
entering this particular slot of 20th century
society they find, or feel they find, the
avenues closed to them because of a fact about
themselves which their whole background has
trained them never to give up, in any circum
stances.23
Insofar as they identify themselves as French Canadians,
the members of Quebec's newly developed middle class are
bothered by a sense of cultural inferiority in those fields
that they prize; namely,.industrialization, economic and
social progress.

Trudeau believes that the problems of the

French Canadian can be best addressed through federalism.
It has been pointed out, however, that ". . . such is the
nature of this nationalist sentiment that it is not enough
that these reforms came about.

They must also be brought

Charles Taylor, "Nationalism and the Political In
telligentsia: A Case Study," Queen's Quarterly, Spring 1965,
p. 158.
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about by the society itself and be purely its own responsi
bility."^'^

Therefore, the demand is not only for moderniz

ing reform but for reform carried out by French Canada, and,
according to one author,

. . since this type of reform

requires an increased intervention by the state, and since
the state concerned must be identified as a French-Canadian
state, the logic of the demand leads to the strengthening
of the state of Quebec, and in the limiting case, indepen25
dence for the province of Quebec."
The Parti Québécois, which only ten years ago was a
splinter group on the fringe of provincial politics, gained
control of the Quebec provincial government by obtaining 41
percent of the popular vote in Quebec's 1976 election; enough
to form a majority government.

Soon the government will hold

a referendum asking the people of Quebec whether or not their
province should take the first steps toward becoming a new,
independent North American nation.

Although the PQ, has cap

tured control of the provincial government, its journey has
only just begun.

Independence for Quebec is the PQ's raison

d'etre and it must convince the rest of its citizens of the
merits of independence.

The main concern here is with the

political costs of such an action as independence.

Even if

the Parti Québécois could guarantee Quebecers that an inde
pendent Quebec would survive economically, there still

^^Ibid., p. 161.
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remains the question if the people of Quebec will accept the
demands which independence would entail.

An independent

Quebec is not a panacea to all the problems of the French
Canadians.

As Marcel Chaput states: ". . . you would be

wrong to think that I consider independence the solution to
all of Quebec's problems; on the contrary, I believe that it
would create many more new ones.'"^^

Rather, independence is

a means of addressing the problems of the French Canadian in
North America.

It is important to note that the political

separation of Quebec from Canada is a means and not an end
in itself.

A free Quebec would entail a great amount of

energy and work on the part of the Québécois, but the PQ
wants a "French solution to Quebec's problems.

The question

remains if the French citizens of Quebec are willing to pay
such a price, if they believe separation to be worthwhile.
It is the self-proclaimed job of the Parti Québécois to con
vince its fellow citizens to strive to obtain this goal.
In order to understand the phenomenon of the Parti
Québécois, the historical context of separatist movements
and the PQ, its party program, and an analysis of its likeli
hood of success will follow.

^^Chaput, op. cit., p. v.

CHAPTER II
FRENCH CANADIAN HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A brief review of French-Canadian history is helpful
in understanding the position of the Québécois in Canada today.
Running through English-French Canadian relations are themes
which have had important consequences on the formation of the
present separatist movement, namely French-Canadian resistence
to pressures of assimilation by their English-speaking counter
parts.
French colonists founded Quebec in 1608, just one year
after English colonists established Jamestown.

Over 150 years

later, in 1760, New France (Quebec) was conquered by British
forces.

With the Treaty of Paris of 1763, Great Britain estab

lished ownership over most of Eastern North America.

French

colonists in Quebec became a conquered people but haVe amazingly
resisted pressures of assimilation, consciously or unconsciously
placed upon them.

One observer writes:

"Unlike the United

States, Canada has never officially accepted the melting pot
concept with respect to the various ethnic groups composing
the population."

27

If it were not for this will for survival,
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versity Press, 1967), pp. 129-30.
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today's French Canadians would not be able to speak of separa
tion.

In fact, identifying oneself as a French Canadian would

only be a phenomenon of the past.
A brief review of the history of French-Canadian rela
tions with English Canada is important because the origin of
many current problems of Quebec are a result of this relation
ship.

A survey of the legislation of the British government

concerning its French-Canadian subjects provides an insight
into English attitudes.

Legislative Acts
Royal Proclamation of 1763
The details of British policy towards its newly acquired
colony were outlined in the Royal Proclamation of 1763.

Quebec

was to be modeled after the other British royal colonies of
North America.

Quebec would observe English laws and be gov

erned by an elective assembly.

The English government hoped

these provisions would encourage British colonists to settle
in the newly acquired territory.

While the Articles of Quebec's

Capitulation provided for the free exercise of the Roman Catholic
religion, the British government assumed, or at least hoped,
that French Canadians would become assimilated into the British
way of life.

One French Canadian writes:

The evolution of this new British colony [New France],
it was felt, would be similar to that of New York,
first settled by Dutch colonists, and of New Jersey,
which had been founded by Swedes. In less than a
century, these two foreign collectivities had melted
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away. The British conquerors of the St. Lawrence
Valley sincerely believed that a similar fate awaited
the Canadians.28
The aims of the Royal Proclamation of 1763, however,
did not succeed in bringing about assimilation.

One reason

was that under British law Roman Catholics were ineligible to
hold office or vote in the assembly.

Since French Canadians

were predominately Catholic, this provision prevented their
participation in government.
The language barrier also prevented French-speaking
Canadians from taking an active part in judicial or legal
affairs since these were conducted in English.

These condi

tions prevented the assimilation of French Canadians because
they barred French-speaking members from participation in the
system.

John S. Moir and D. M. L. Farr suggest in their book.

The Canadian Experience:

"Common sense, political realism and

simple justice to the French Canadians demanded a new constitu
tion to ensure them membership on juries, protection for
• 29
seigneurial rights, and use of their customary laws."

Quebec Act of 1774
A solution for these problems was provided by the Quebec
Act of 1774.

This act restored something similar to that of New

France's former constitution.

A governor would rule through a
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council, while the assembly provided for by the Royal Proclama
tion of 1763 was dismissed.

Roman Catholics were now eligible

to hold public office, even though they were not anywhere else
in the-- British Empire.

The Catholic Church was also given

legal power to demand payment of the tithe (an assessment of
one-tenth of the church member's income, which was used to sup
port the Church and its clergy) and the seigneurs (feudal lords)
resumed their pre-conquest status.

Finally, Quebec was given

the territory of the Ohio Valley.
The Quebec Act of 1774 has been called the "... Magna
30
Carta of French Canadian national rights and privileges."
The act removed the anti-French and anti-Catholic bias of ear
lier British policies.

French Canadians were placed on an

equal political and religious status with the English Canadians.
As a result French Canadians obtained a means of maintaining
their identity within the English household of their conquerors.
It was hoped that the Quebec Act would capture the sup
port of French Canadians for the British government.
not to be the case.

This was

When the thirteen American colonies re

volted against Britain in 1776, the English government expected
French Canadians to contribute to its forces in the campaign to
suppress the uprising.

Although French Canadians refused to

support the American colonists, they were equally unwilling to
fight for the British cause.

Thus the Quebec Act, like the Royal

F. C. Stanley, "Act or Pact? Another Look at Con
federation," in Confederation, Ramsay Cook et al. (Toronto;
University of Toronto Press, 1967), p. 96.
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Proclamation of 1763 before it, failed to produce a feeling of
French-Canadian loyalty to the British Empire.
Although the Quebec Act ensured the protection of French
Canadian fights, it was aimed at strengthening the ties between
her and Great Britain.

The approach employed by the English

government had changed since 1763, but the end remained the
same:

to make French Canadians fit the fabric of their English

counterparts.
Not only did the American Revolution result in the inde
pendence of the English colonies, but it also destroyed the
basic assumption underlying the Quebec Act:

that the province

of Quebec would remain French in character.

As a result of the

revolution, many English colonists from America who remained
loyal to the British crown (United Empire Loyalists) fled to
Quebec.

These new arrivals were predominately English Protestants

and wanted the British government to enact new policies which
would be more in line with their customs rather than those of
the French.

English Canadians, now in closer contact with the

French, sought to restructure the government.
Constitutional Act of 1791
The answer to these demands was provided by the Constitu
tional Act of 1791.

According to the provisions of this act,

Canada was politically divided into two colonies--Upper (English)
and Lower (French) Canada.

Both were given elective assemblies,

reversing the decision of the Quebec Act of 1774.

Thus French

and English could live under their own divergent customs.
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Once again it seemed the British government had assured
the French the right to maintain their unique identity by allow
ing them to choose their own elective assembly, but this was not
the case.

The Constitutional Act attempted to weaken the

strength of the Catholic Church by establishing Anglicanism as
the state religion.

An Anglican bishop was appointed to Quebec

and one-eighth of the Crown lands was to be reserved as an en
dowment for the support of the Protestant clergy.
However, the main consequence of the Constitutional Act
was not anglicization but the renewal of the French Canadian
separateness.

The Act provided French Canadians with a geo

graphical as well as a political base.

One observer writes:

"If the Quebec Act of 1774 guaranteed the survival of the French
Canadians, the Constitutional Act of 1791 guaranteed the survival of French Canada."
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The granting of an Assembly to Lower

Canada provided a major force in the development of the colony's
political development.

Another French Canadian observer writes;

"Once given the vote and admitted to the assembly (privileges
denied to Roman Catholics, in Britain until 1829), the French
Canadians dispelled any notions of their political indifference
or ineptness by quickly learning to use the parliamentary system
for their own ends."

32

Though the Act provided for the estab

lishment of a predominately British colony (Upper Canada), more
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importantly for the future of the French Canadians it assured
them of la. survivance.

As was the case with the Quebec Act of

1774, the Constitutional Act gave French Canadians a means by
which they could protect their unique culture.

Revolt and the Durham Report
Although both French and English colonists had acquired
an assembly form of government, one problem still plagued both
groups; the desires of the colonists could not be imposed on
the executives.

Britain still retained the power to appoint

the executives of each colony and therefore had the final word
in decision making for the colonies.

In other words, the colo

nies had a representative but not a responsible (cabinet) gov
ernment.

Upper and Lower Canada were ruled by local oligarchies.

In Upper Canada this group was known as the "Family Compact" and
in Lower Canada its equivalent was the Chateau Clique.

The

French Canadians of Lower Canada had greater reason for concern
since the Chateau Clique was disproportionately dominated by
English-speaking Canadians.
In 1837, rebellion erupted in both Upper and Lower
Canada as a result of the English government's failure to heed
the Canadian colony's demands for elective councils.

The

British Parliament issued its Ten Resolutions of 1837 to this
effect, which in turn sparked the revolt.
Other factors were also responsible for this outbreak
of violence.

Groups in Upper Canada felt the economic progress
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of their province was being stifled by French-Canadian dominance.
The more business-minded English Canadian believed that the
isolationist-minded French Canadians were a detriment.

Also,

a recession had struck the colonies in 1836, along with crop
failures in the Montreal-Richelieu area.

Thus political, eco

nomic and racial problems combined to fuel the rebellion.
Although the rebellion was suppressed without much dif
ficulty, it prompted an investigation by the British government
into the problems of the colonists.

The recommendations of that

study, the Durham Report, demonstrate that the British govern
ment had not given up attempts to assimilate the French-speaking
Canadians, even though provisions of previous acts had given
FrenrcJi^anadians cultural guarantees and geographical sovereignty.
John George Lambton, first Earl of Durham, was sent by
the English government to ascertain the problems of the Canadian
colonies and make recommendations.
Durham Report was released.

On January 31, 1839, the

It recommended the concession of

effective self-government to be granted to the Canadians, the
very measure which the colonists were demanding.

"But if Dur

ham favored self-government (or what is known in our history as
responsible) it was only for government dominated by Englishspeaking people.
over again,"

33

It was the old policy of assimilation all

writes one historian.

A legislative union of

the two Canadas would be formed with the hope that the combined

F. C. Stanley, op. cit., p. 99.
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English-speaking majority in the two provinces would ensure the
English domination of the colonies.
Understandably, the Report caused a wave of negative
reaction among French Canadians.

Although a major proposal of

the Durham Report would provide a means for English domination
of the French, its actual effect was to strengthen the efforts
of French Canadians to protect their identity.

According to

one author, Durham's biggest mistake was based upon, ". . .
this . . . miscalculation . . . that the French could be angli
cized, that eighty years of British encouragement to FrenchCanadian nationalism could be reversed by a mere political
J
• •
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decision."
When Britain first obtained control of New France in
1763, it followed a policy of leniency and toleration.

As time

went on, the British government gave more authority to the
French Canadians in an attempt to ensure their loyalty to the
Empire, especially during the period of the American Revolution.
Thus outside forces, such as the fear of revolt spreading from
the American colonies to those in Canada, and the American in
vasion of 1812 to 1814, were as much responsible for the conces
sions to the French as was the concern for protection of their
French culture.

Within each measure enacted concerning the

French Canadians was the assumption that French-speaking Cana
dians would be co-opted into the culture of their Englishspeaking contemporaries.

^^Moir and Farr, op. cit., p. 147,
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These actions demonstrate the misunderstanding which
the British government possessed concerning their new subjects,
French Canadians, above all else, have been concerned with
protecting their unique cultural and racial identity.

They

gladly took advantage of those measures granted them by the
English Parliament which they could utilize to protect their
culture; for example, French language guarantees a government
by an elected assembly.

French Canadians utilized such mea

sures to remain distinct from the rest of English Canada.

The

belief that all this could be changed by an act of government
illustrates how naive the English government was concerning
their French subjects.

Act of Union of 1840
The English government once again attempted to anglicize
French Canadians by passing the Act of Union of 1840.

When

Britain acquired New France, it numbered less than the French
Canadians in Canada.

As time passed, many English came to feel

their French counterparts were stifling their economic develop
ment.

French Canadians were less interested in agricultural

and industrial growth than were the English.

Thus English

Canadians sought a political arrangement to circumvent the
power of French Canada.
the best solution.

The Act of Union seemed to provide

The English government felt that.

The only way to defeat the French majority would be
to crib, cabin, and confine it to Lower Canada; and
this could best be done by preserving as distinct,
political entities the two provinces which had been
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proposed to obliterate and by giving each of them
equal representation in the new legislature.35
Upper and Lower Canada were reunited and Upper Canada, despite
its smaller population, was given equal representation with
Lower Canada.

Upper Canada's high public debt was also trans

ferred to Lower Canada.

Finally, English was to be the

only official language.
Understandably, most members of Lower Canada viewed
the Act of Union with hostility.

They resented their reduced

representation, the burden of Upper Canada's debt, and the ob
vious anglicizing purposes of the Act.

Ironically, this

blatant attempt of "enforced Anglicization" was later to back
fire against the English when the English population surpassed
the number of French Canadians.

The advantage thus shifted to

the French Canadians who, although they were now a numerical
minority, still possessed equal representation vis-a-vis the
English Canadians.
The Union lasted only twenty-five years and .ended amidst
cries of "No Popery" and "No French Domination" -- slogans of
the Clear Grits Party of Canada West (Upper Canada) who were
upset that French Canadians, now comprising a minority, held
equal representation with the English-speaking Canadian ma
jority.

Now that English Canadians comprised a majority, they

sought once again to change the political system so that it
would be more advantageous to their interests.
writes :

F. C. Stanley, op. cit., p. 100.

One author
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Canada East's (French Canada) equal voice in the
united parliament not only enabled it to stall
progressive measures that Canada West deemed
necessary, but even to impose its solution to
Canada West's problems, as in the case of sepa
rate school legislation. Within the Union the
two Canadas were equal partners politically,
but Canada West, now larger in population and more
dynamic complained of French domination and of
minority rule.36

British North America Act
The late 1860s have been described as a period of
stalemate between French and English Canadians.

Several solu

tions were proposed, each aiming at solving the problem of
French and English political relations.

The existence of a

strong French-Canadian minority continued to make its presence
felt in the decisions of Canada.
The Clear Grits Party ("all sand and no dirt - clear
grit all the way through"), under the leadership of Toronto
journalist George Brown, advocated the principle of "representa
tion by population."

This policy sought to minimize the power

of French Canadians who had become a numerical minority since
the passage of the Act of Union in 1840,

According to one

political analyst:
Grittism began with a demand for simple, economical
government and an extension of elective institu
tions on the American model. After George Brown,
the publisher of the Toronto Globe, joined the
movement, it took on a pronounced anti-Catholic
tone. The fact that Upper Canada was growing
more rapidly than Lower Canada but that the two
sections had equal representation in the legislature

^^Moir and Farr, op. cit., p. 207.
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gave the Grits a grievance which they exploited
to the full in the cry for 'Representation by
Population.' Against Macdonald - Cartier con
servatism, which it declared to be a corrupt
alliance of the Roman Catholic Church with the
Bank of Montreal and the Grant Trunk Railway,
the Globe championed the interests of 'the intel
ligent yeomanry of Upper Canada,' and at the same
time supported the claims of Toronto as a com
mercial and transportation centre against Mon
treal.37
The demand for "Rep. by Pop." was vigorously opposed
by French Canadians, who regarded the proposal as nothing less
than an attempt to destroy French institutions and French
rights in Canada.
The Clear Grits Party became one of the most dynamic
movements in Canadian politics, driven by the issue of equal
representation between Canada East and West.

How could the

representation of Canada East and Canada West remain the same
while the upper province contributed two-thirds of the revenue
and seemed destined by 1861 to out-distance the lower province
in wealth and population?

The Clear Grits Party objected to

the wasteful duplication of expenditures, the "intolerable
domination" of Canada East in forcing separate schools upon
the upper province in defiance of the Globe's crusade against
"state-churchism," and other evidences of the "subordination"
which would continue to grow increasingly irksome with every
cause.
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English Canadians demanded change.

John Sandfield Macdonald promoted the "double majority
principle."

This would ensure that no legislation could be

passed for one section of the province without the approval of
the majority of that section, thus restricting government mea
sures to those which could command a majority in both sections
of the province.

This concept was deemed unacceptable because

it was believed that it would tend to promote sectionalism and
was counter to the institution of responsible government.
A federal solution was campaigned for mainly by John S.
Macdonald,

A source of continuing conflict between Quebec and

Ottawa had been the difference of opinion between French and
English Canadians as to the purpose of the federation.

Finally,

the alternative of separation of French and English Canada
existed.

Outside forces, though, made this alternative unattrac

tive to both parties; namely, the fear of domination by the
United States.
Each of these proposed solutions attempted to solve
the French-Canadian problem.

English-speaking Canadians were

more concerned with establishing themselves in a position of
political dominance than in respecting the rights of the French
minority.

French Canadians, on the other hand, sought to pro
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tect their unique culture.

Federalism seemed to offer the only

acceptable solution to both sides.
The stalemate was broken by "the great coalition" of
1864.

George Brown and the Grits entered into a coalition

ministry with their arch enemy Macdonald, described by one his
torian as: "... a tribute to the patriotism of George Brown.
For him it meant the virtual wrecking of a party of which he
had served as leader for many years.Brown sought to pre
vent a split between the two Canadas

because he wished to

maintain the British connection and wanted to promote the west
ward expansion of Canada.

For both of these the continued

association of the Canadas in the St. Lawrence system was im
perative.

Although this coalition did not last long, Brown's

conduct made possible Canadian federation which in turn resulted
in an entirely new alignment in Canadian political life.
Divergent French and English expectations concerning the
value and purpose of confederation underlie the current problems
between Quebec and Ottawa today.

The continuing belief of the

English Canadian, since the conquest in 1763 up to the Federa
tion of 1867, that French Canadians would eventually become
assimilated demonstrates their lack of understanding of the
French Canadian.
English Canadians sought to establish a strong central
government which would enable them to expand economically

^^Carl Frederick Wittke, A History of Canada (New York:
F. S. Crofts and Company, 1942), p. 181.
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without the crippling opposition of any one province,
specifically Quebec.

Improvement of railway communications

and westward expansion were examples of the developments
sought by English-speaking Canadians.

The political impasse

which had developed between French and English Canadians
under the Act of Union prevented English businessmen from
developing such interests as these as quickly as they would
have preferred.
French Canadians sought a weak central government,
contrary to what English Canadians hoped for in confederation.
Their main concern was to prevent the centralizing tendencies
of a federation from usurping their authority and therefore
threatening the survival of their French culture.

French Cana

dians did agree to join the federation despite this fear be
cause they felt more secure in an alliance with Britain rather
than their neighbor, the United States.

At least with the

British they had extracted guarantees, such as protection of
their language rights, while many feared the assimilative
powers of the American democracy.
Ramsay Cook commented on the divergent views of the
French and English Canadians, saying that, "Confederation has
never held, for French Canadians, the same all-important place
in the nation's history as it has for English Canadians.

In

deed, some French-Canadian nationalist writers have viewed
Confederation not as a triumph, but rather as a tragedy for
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their people."

Many French Canadians at the time felt they

had little choice.

An observer states:

"Every pro-confederate

French-Canadian speaker in the Canadian debate used lurid
colours to depict the end of 1^ survivance, of the 'French fact'
in North America, if Canada were to be swallowed by the 'uni
versal democracy' of the American Republic.G. E. Cartier,
who helped persuade French Canadians to join the federation,
said: "Absorption in conformist American democracy would cer
tainly follow if the fabric of a new national state were not
woven in the north.Still, many suspected the proposed
federation as a plot to revive the anglicizing goals of Durham
under a new disguise.

Even today some French-Canadian nation

alist leaders feel Cartier committed the original vendu (he
sold out the French-Canadian interest).
Canada's federation, therefore, was partly established
as a result of negative considerations.

Both groups sought to

protect themselves, but survival involved different considera
tions for each group.

As one historian states: "For English-

speaking central Canadians, survival meant expansion and accumu
lating sufficient strength to resist continentalism.

For most

French Canadians survival meant guarding their language, religion
and laws in the region they already occupied.
4lRamsay Cook et al., éd.. Confederation (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1967), p. x.
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Assimilation, though, was not the objective of the
British North America Act.

Protection of provincial rights

is a major facet of its provisions.

The B.N.A. Act explicitly

guaranteed the rights of the French language and the establish
ment of separate schools for French-speaking Canadians.

It has

been noted that, because of French Canadian wariness of assimi
lation: "What ever else Canadian federalism might mean, it was
clear that it had to be free from any reasonable suspicion of
being a device to bring about the assimilation of French
4S
Canada. ..."
The British North America Act went into effect July 1,
1867.

Such provisions as the power of disallowance and assign

ment of residual powers to the central government seemed to
insure the dominance of the central government.

According to

the B.N.A. Act, any provincial legislation may be disallowed by
the Governor-General-in-Council within one year of its receipt
by the Federal government.

Thus the cabinet has the power to

render inoperative and void any provincial act, for any reason
which may seem fitting to the federal government.

Examples of

reason for its use include contrary to sound principles of
legislation, ultra vires, unjust, and discriminatory.
However, this was not to be the case, largely as a re
sult of the decisions of the Judicial Branch of the British
Privy Council, which acted as the final appellate court for

^^F. R. Scott, "French-Canada and Canadian Federalism,"
in Evolving Canadian Federalism, A. R. M. Lower et al. (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1958), p. 61.
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Canada from 1890 until 1949,

Cases involving disputes be

tween the central government and the provinces were consis
tently decided in favor of the provincial governments.

As

a result, power was shifted from the central government to
its provincial counterparts.

Increasing Federal Power
Recently the Canadian federal government has gained
more power relative to the provinces mainly as a result of
World Wars One and Two and the Depression of the 1930s.

Be

cause of the extraordinary burdens these events placed upon
Canada, the provinces surrendered many of their powers, for
example, taxation authority, to enable Canada to deal more
effectively with these crises.
Today many provinces, including Quebec, have diffi
culty in meeting their responsibilities because of a lack of
revenue.

As a result they are forced to rely upon grants and

subsidies from the federal government to meet their obligations.
Accompanying these funds are regulations imposed by the central
government upon the recipient.
French Canadians of Quebec are extremely unhappy with
this situation.

Because of their deep concern for protecting

their unique customs and language, they have sought to prevent
as much outside "interference" as possible.

The provincial

government of Quebec has adopted the role as protector of French
Canadian culture in Canada, which was once occupied by the
Catholic Church, and therefore the provincial government of
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Quebec has resisted what they feel is federal usurption of
their provincial governmental power.
An example of this behavior was the rule of Quebec's
Premier Maurice Duplessis.

He rejected all national plans

that were based on a uniform treatment of the provinces, in
cluding the programs of the post-1945 tax rental agreements,
the Trans-Canada Highway project, and federal aid to univer
sities.
For most of their history of association with English
Canadians, French-speaking Canadians have remained isolated
within the province of Quebec in hopes of protecting their way
of life.

They only became involved in Canadian national poli

cies which directly affected them.

Because of this isolation,

English Canadians in the past have not been very concerned with
their French-Canadian counterparts.

More importantly, it has

resulted in the formation of unfavorable stereotypes of the
French.

Only the writings of extreme ultra-national groups

received attention in English Canada.
are seldom heard.

More moderate groups

English-Canadian attitudes towards their

French citizens have been shaped mainly by memories of FrenchCanadian opposition, for example, the Conscription Crisis of
1914.
English Canadians are also partly to blame for this
lack of understanding.

According to one writer, the English

". . . believed that they were innately superior to all
'foreigners', and particularly to foreigners who did not
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speak English or spoke it with an accent to them."^^
As this brief review has shown, most of French-Canadian
history has been devoted to resisting the pressures of EnglishCanadian assimilation.

French Canadians have utilized those

opportunities which enabled them to sustain their unique culture,
such as the Quebec Act of 1774 which placed French Canadians on
an equal political and religious status with the English Canadi
ans, the Constitutional Act of 1791 which provided a geographi
cal as well as a political base for the French, and the Act of
Union of 1840 which later provided them with equal representa
tion even though they were to become a minority. ,It was through
this defensive nationalism that French Canadians sought to main
tain their identity.
French-Canadian Nationalism
Today, French Canadians are no longer willing to defer
to the present English-dominated Canadian federal government.
A new sense of nationalism has permeated the Québécois prompt
ing some even to seek separation from the Canadian federation.
One study conducted by a group of scholars, the Canada 70 Team,
found that:
Today he [the French Canadian] understands. And his
understanding is this, he is not, in fact, a minority
within the framework or the country of Canada but
rather one of two majorities. French Canadians have

^^Mason Wade, Canadian Dualism (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1960), p. 11.
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awakened to this fact that they have political
power as a homogeneous people with a territory
and a government of their own.4?

Bilingualism Policy

In the 1960s, the central government became concerned
with the bilingual and bicultural problems in response to
French Canadian demands.

They sought to strengthen the con

cept of an equal partnership between the two founding races.
In 1963, L. B. Pearson established a royal commission directed
by Andre Laurendeau and A. D, Dunton, the Royal Commission on
Bilingualism and Biculturalism, to investigate the current
state of bilingualism and biculturalism and to recommend steps
to strengthen the concept.

In analyzing Canadian attitudes

towards the bicultural problem the Commission concluded:
The chief protagonists, whether they are entirely
conscious of it or not, are French-speaking Quebec
and English-speaking Canada. And it seems to us
to be no longer the traditional conflict between
a majority or minority. It is rather a conflict
between two majorities: that which is a majority'
in all of Canada, and that which is a majority
in the entity of Quebec.
That is to say, French-speaking Quebec acted
for a long time as though at least it had accepted
the idea of being merely a privileged "ethnic mi
nority." Today, the kind of opinion we met so
often in the province regards Quebec practically
as an autonomous society, and expects her to be
recognized as one.
This attitude goes back to a fundamental ex
pectation for French Canada, that is, to be an
equal partner with English-speaking Canada. If
this idea is found to be impossible, because such

^^Canada 70 Team, Quebec, The Threat of Separation
(Toronto; McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1969), p. 142.
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equality is not believed in or is not acceptable, we
believe the sense of deception will bring decisive
consequences. An important element in Frenchspeaking Quebec is already tempted to go it alone.
Incompleteness of bilingualism is a source of irrita
tion for Quebecers.

Yet any extension of the use of the

French language annoys certain groups in the other Englishspeaking provinces.

One English Canadian writes:

However well-intentioned, the move to save Confed
eration by attempting to implement a policy of
official bilingualism was doomed from the very
start by the failure of its proponents to recognize
one vital fact, Canada is not a single state in
habited by two principal peoples, spread across the
land. . . . Instead, Canada is divided geographi
cally into two entirely regional cultures, the
attempt to introduce the alien language into each
of the regions is bound to be unwelcomed and, in
the cause of the English-speaking section which
constitutes the vast majority of Canada, totally
impractical.49
Others oppose the policy of bilingualism for different
reasons.

According to one writer, bilingualism ". . . sancti

fies the separation much more than doing away with it."^^

Dr.

Marcel Chaput, on the other hand, believes bilingualism is
". . . a meaningless word, a sin against nature,that French
Canadians are, "... shut up in the vicious circle of

^^John S. Moir and D. M. L. Farr, The Canadian Experi
ence (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1969), pp. 562-563.
^^James B. Lamb, The Other Canada (Windsor, Nova
Scotia: Lancelot Press Limited, 1972), p. 118.
^^Fernand Dumont, The Vigil of Quebec (Toronto: Uni
versity of Toronto Press, 1971), p. ix.
^^Marcel Chaput, Why I Am A Separatist (Toronto: The
Ryerson Press, 1961), p. 19.
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destructive bilingualism."
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Many separatists fear that

bilingualism will only lead to assimilation, that in claim
ing that French Canadians have rights throughout Canada,
English Canadians seek only to disperse French Canadians
from Quebec and thereby assimilate them.
Levesque:

According to Rene

". . . instead of strengthening Quebec, they talk

of a revival of French-Canada outside our borders.

Let us

say very, very calmly: what they are proposing to us now is
53
a sucker's game. ..."
According to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism
and Biculturalism Report:
Whenever a bilingual state preserves the integrity
of its language groups, the tensions that might
arise are neutralized to the extent that each of
the groups within the state has a sense of cultural
security. When a country fails to provide this
sense of cultural security, the minority, seeing
its language threatened, often tends to harbour
feelings of hostility toward the majority and to
look for other solutions, including various forms
of 'national' self-determination outside the frame
work of the bilingual state.54
It is this lack of cultural security which is spurring many
French Canadians toward separatism.

Many French Canadians

feel that the central government's policy of bilingualism
is only an attempt to achieve assimilation.
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau disagrees.
52

He writes:

Chaput, op. cit., p. viii.

^^Rene Levesque, An Option for Quebec (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1968), p. 84.
^^Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism
Report, vol. 1 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1967), p. 14.
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I am afraid that excessive preoccupation with the
future of the language has made certain people
forget the future of the man speaking it . . . no
constitutional reform - indeed not even a declara
tion of independence could make French a major lan
guage of business and industry in North America,
or make Quebec a state capable of dictating its
terms to the rest of the continent.55
Precisely because French Canadians are such a small minority
in Canada, as well as in North America, Trudeau feels they
cannot enclose themselves within Quebec.

Rather, Prime Min

ister Trudeau writes, ". . . Canadian federalism is ideal.
The federal system obliges Quebec's political culture to stand
the test of competition at the federal level, while allowing
Quebec to choose the form of government best suited to its
needs at the provincial level.
Trudeau and those who advocate the federal system feel
that the only way French Canadians can survive and prosper in
their minority status is to compete with the rest of North
America in which they are destined to live.

Trudeau, however,

acknowledges that, "... the whole citizenry must be made to
feel that it is only within the framework of the federal state
that their language, culture, institutions, sacred traditions,
and standard of living can be protected from external attack
and internal strife."
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^^Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Federalism and the French
Canadians (Toronto: Macmillin of Canada, 1968), pp. 7-8.
S^ibid., p. 33.

S^Ibid., p. 193.
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Thus the stage is set between the federalists and
those advocating political separation for Quebec.

Separatists

believe that federalism is an obsolete political framework
which does not represent the best interests of the people of
Quebec.

Within this environment of political dissatisfaction,

the Parti Québécois has risen to power.

The circumstances of

its formation and development is important in assessing its
future.

CHAPTER III
FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
PARTI QUEBECOIS

The call for political independence for the province
of Quebec is not a new phenomenon.

Ever since Britain's vic

tory over the French in 1760, some French Canadians have
argued for the independence of Quebec.
Separatism and World War I
In 1917, during Canada's participation in the First
World War, violence broke out between French and English Cana
dians.

During the course of the war, French Canadian enlist

ments, which were never high, began to dwindle.
many reasons for this:

There were

the overwhelmingly English nature of

the armed forces, the lack of French Canadians, and the belief
that it was a war to preserve the British Empire.

French Cana

dians, who had been cut off from Europe since 1759, were not
as anxious as English Canadians, many of whom had just arrived
from England, to fight in defense of Britain.

More and more

enlistments were needed as the war continued.

In an effort to

prevent the need for conscription, French-Canadian leaders,
such as Laurier and the Catholic Church hierarchy, campaigned
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for the French to volunteer.

Finally, in 1918, the federal

government felt that conscription was necessary and Prime
Minister Borden announced that it would soon be initiated.
The reaction in Quebec included riots, attacks on progovernment newspapers, and mass demonstrations.
During this period, the Deputy of Lotbiniere of the
Legislative Assembly (the former name of the National Assembly)
proposed the expiration of the federal pact of 1867 in order
to take Quebec out of the federation,

, . if the other pro

vinces find that Quebec is an obstacle to the union, to the
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progress and development of Canada."

Although the proposi

tion was not carried out, the idea of political independence
had once again been introduced.

Fortunately, the war soon

ended and the crisis was over for the time being.

However,

the memory of the conflict still remained and would fuel bit
ter feelings on both sides in future disagreements.
Separatist sentiments

arose

again in 1939.

The news

paper La Nation published a letter by Lionel Grouix, who advo
cated the idea of provoking the dismemberment of Canada.

The

chief editor of La Nation, Pierre Chaloult, declared in his
editorial: "It is understood, we are separatists!"
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La Na

tion declared itself an instrument for the movement of politi
cal separation for Quebec.
CO

y

Quebec en Bref, "l'évolution of independanisme
dequis soixante ans," July 1977, p. 4.
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On March 6, 1937, Quebecers read in Le Devoir an
article by Georges Pelletier entitled "Confederation? - Cana
dian Republic? - French Free State?"

That same year Lostaler

O'Leary published his book, Separatism, a Constructive Doc
trine.
Separatism and World War II

New difficulties arose

between the two linguistic

groups during the Second World War and again revolved around
the issue of conscription.

When Canada entered the Second

World War in 1939, Prime Minister Mackenzie King did not want
to prompt the recurrence of the 1917 crisis and hence he
promised not to institute conscription.

The demands of total

war, though, soon outran voluntary enlistment just as it had
done in World War One.

The Conservative opposition and other

elements, including the military, demanded that conscription
be enacted.

Prime Minister King, in order to avoid another

full-scale crisis, sought a national referendum to permit the
government to back out of. its promise to French Canada.
referendum proved to be a disaster,

The

French Canadian groups

such as La Ligue pour la defense du Canada, supported by the
lower clergy, campaigned for a non vote, although this action
was contrary to the wishes of the politicians and the upper
hierarchy of the Catholic Church.

In the eight English-

speaking provinces the vote went 80 percent in favor of the
referendum; in Quebec it was 72 percent against and among
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French Canadians in Quebec the non vote rose to 85 percent.
Opposition to the war in Quebec was polarized by the campaign
and statements on each side grew more bitter.

^ Ligue grew

stronger and became a political party; the Bloc Populaire.
The government managed to avoid imposing conscription
until 1944, when it finally appeared that King could no longer
satisfy both English and French sections of the party and
country.

French-Canadian leaders realized that it would be

better to have limited conscription under King than full con
scription under the English-dominated government that would
replace him should his government fall.

Although a full-scale

crisis was avoided, again an air of mistrust remained between
French and English Canadians.

Fortunately, the war was by now

almost over and it did not become necessary to send any of the
draftees into battle.
Maurice Duplessis and FrenchCanadian Nationalism

French nationalism found expression in the formation of
the Quebec provincial party, L'Union Nationale, led by Maurice
Duplessis.

Duplessis was elected in 1936 on a program of

provincial rights and opposition to the federal government and
English-owned business.

With the sole exception of 1939 this

appeal led him to victory in every election until 1958,

During

^^Richard Van Loon and Michael Whittington, The Canadian
Political System. Environment, Structure, and Process (Toronto:
McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1976), p. 70.
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his administration, conflict frequently arose between the
federal government and Quebec, usually with the province pro
testing against alleged encroachments on provincial jurisdic
tion, especially concerning federal anti-depression measures.
According to one author: "This institutionalization of FrenchEnglish conflict was important in keeping some sort of re
straint on French-English relations during most of the
Duplessis period.With the exception of the 1944 conscrip
tion crisis, the most visible expressions of the EnglishFrench cleavage were arguments which broke out in federalprovincial conferences and the speeches of Duplessis which
attacked the federal government.
Jean Lesage and the Quiet Revolution

The immediate postwar period and the 1950s was a time
of apparent calm in Quebec, except for the occasional attacks
of Maurice Duplessis against the federal government.
things were not as calm as they seemed.

However,

Quebec society had

been going through a period of rapid urbanization and indus
trialization and Quebecers were becoming more and more dis
turbed with the growing economic dominance of the English
Canadians, both within and outside Quebec.
What has come to be known as the Quiet Revolution
started with the death of Maurice Duplessis in 1959.

His suc

cessors were unable to establish the tight control that he had

Ibid., p. 69,
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been able to establish over Quebec.

In 1960, the Union

Nationale was finally defeated by the Liberal Party, lead by
Jean Lesage, under the campaign slogan, maîtres chez nous
(Masters in our own house).

Lesage advocated "positive

Québécois nationalism" rather than the negative policies
of Duplessis.^^

The Lesage administration favored expanded

government participation in the economic affairs of Quebec,
which included the nationalization of eleven power companies
with the formation of Quebec Hydro.

Rene Levesque, at the

time Minister of Natural Resources, was instrumental in na
tionalizing Quebec's hydroelectric power.
The purpose of this nationalization was not only to
achieve more control over the Quebec economy, but also to en
sure the recognition of the French language in the business
/

life of the province.

Commenting on the nationalization, Rene

Levesque wrote:
Our long-range and not-so-long range objective is to
take over the economic life of Montreal as of the
rest of the province on the basis of something com
parable to what we represent in the province because
people are more important than business, and as
people we are 80 percent. And no self-respecting
people in the world ever accept to be something
like a servant in his own homeland.63
The Lesage administration also advocated greater gov
ernmental participation in education.

The Department of

Bartlet Brebner, Canada (Ann Arbor; The University
of Michigan Press, 1970), p. 544.
G^ibid., p. 545.
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Education was reorganized and unified, with the consequent
transfer of responsibility for education from the church to
the state.

Government control over the universities was also

increased.

During Lesage's administration, Quebec's annual

budget grew from 600 million to over two billion dollars;
health, education, and welfare replaced roads and agriculture
as top priorities.Lesage also proposed the improvement of
the position of the French within the federal framework.

The

forces of separatism, however, were making their presence felt.
Starting with a pamphlet called Pourquoi je suis séparatiste
by Marcel Chaput, a disaffected scientist with the federal
Defense Research Board, and carrying on with a wave of terror
ism under the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ), separatism
gained in strength in Quebec.

Marcel Chaput writes: "In short,

we want independence for Quebec because it would represent
liberation, internationalism and a springboard into the whole
world, whereas present Confederation, from our minority, means
isolation and stagnation.
In the election of June 5, 1966, the Lesage administra
tion was defeated by Daniel Johnson's Union Nationale.

However,

during this time, an important group of Quebecers felt the need

^^Andre Larocque, "Political Institutions and Quebec
Society," in Quebec Society and Politics: Views from the In
side , ed. Dale C. Thomson (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart
Limited, 1973), p. 78.
^^Marcel Chaput, Why I am a Separatist (Toronto:
The Ryerson Press, 1961), p. 19.
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to alter the trend of Quebec nationalism.

According to an

observer :
Some of the prime intellectual movers of the Quiet
Revolution, notably Pierre Elliot Trudeau and his
closest associates, became concerned that the com
bination of head-strong Quebec nationalism and
Ottawa's highly pragmatic flexibility was eroding
the federal system. They determined to enter fed
eral politics in the November, 1965, elections to
halt this process, and make Ottawa a more effective
counterweight to Quebec C i t y , 6 6
The Union Nationale

Some observers have stated that the Union Nationale's
victory of 1966 was a result of outdated electoral laws which
favored rural areas.Others think the surprise defeat of the
Liberal government was a popular reaction against the Quiet
Revolution and a return to the gloomy conditions that had
marked earlier Union Nationale administrations.
the case.

This was not

The electoral statistics indicate that the public

gave less support to the Union Nationale in 1966 than in 1962.
Its share of the vote dropped from 42.1 percent to 40.9 percent,
while the Liberal share fell from 56.4 percent to 47.2 percent.
Therefore, the Union Nationale did not defeat the Liberal
administration by taking away its electoral strength, the outcome
was rather a result of the efforts of two separatist parties, the
Ralliement National (RN) and the Rassemblement pour 1'Independence
^^Dale C. Thomson, Quebec Society and Politics: Views
from the Inside (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1973),
p. 15.
G^Ibid., p. 16.
G^Larocque, op. cit., p. 78.
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Nationale (RIN).

Together these two parties captured 8 percent

of the popular vote and brought about the defeat of Liberal
candidates in a number of constituencies.

"Yet," writes a

political scientist, "these two parties, particularly the RIN,
were dedicated to speeding up the Quiet Revolution, not to
stopping it.

Their goal was not to retard the construction

of a national state in Quebec, but, on the contrary, to de69
velop it as an independent national entity."
Daniel Johnson died in October 1968, leaving observers
wondering if he had promoted separation or continued federation.
At the Dominion-Provincial Conference on February 6, 1968,
Johnson proposed a "special status" for Quebec, which Justice
Minister Trudeau opposed.

Jean-Jacques Bertrand, Johnson's

successor and a committed federalist, was defeated in the
1970 elections by the Liberal Party under the leadership of
Robert Bourassa.

Bourassa
Bourassa wanted a strong Quebec, but one that would
remain within the Canadian federation.

He devoted his admin

istration to solving Quebec's problems through financial and
economic means rather than legal formulas.

Bourassa argued

that separatism would destroy the economy of Quebec and

^^Ibid., p. 79.
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drastically alter the standard of living of the Québécois.
One observer notes: "It was economics that won the election
for the Liberals, but economics may yet be the reason why
Quebecers opt for independence."
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The Separatist Movement
One of the main problems which has plagued the separa
tist movement in Quebec was the splintered leadership.

The

separatist movement consisted of a number of highly diverse
groups advocating independence.

In 1957, Raymond Barbeau

formed the Alliance Laurentienne, a rightist group with cleri
cal and corporatist tendencies, which had few members.

Dur

ing September of 1960, a leftist group, the Action pour I'independence du Quebec (ASIQ) and the RIN were established.
Marcel Chaput was vice-president of the RIN and ran for the
Quebec Legislative Assembly, but the RIN, a pressure group
rather than a political party, refused to get directly in
volved in Chaput's campaign.

Chaput was defeated and, angry

with the RIN, formed the Parti republican du Quebec (PRQ),
the first separatist political party.

Raymond Barbeau, his

Alliance Laurentienne faltering in 1962, requested that his
members join the PRQ, but the PRQ itself only enjoyed a short
existence because of financial difficulties.
The fragmentation of groups devoted to separatism

W. Hagy, "le Parti québécois in the 1970 Elec
tions," Queens Quarterly, vol. 77 (1970), p. 273.
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continued.

In 1963, the Front de la liberation québécois

burst onto the scene.

Composed of a small group of middle-

class youths, they sought to achieve the independence of
Quebec through terrorism.

Most of its members were arrested.

The Armee revolution québécois sought to replace the FLQ but
never was very active.

Other minor separatist groups of the

1960s included the Parti socialiste du Quebec (PSQ) which
split as soon as it was formed into three groups; the Parti
Pris, a radical party which appealed mainly to intellectuals;
the Phalange, an extreme right-wing group founded by Leo
Trembly; and the Chevaliers de 1'independence, organized by
a professional boxer named Reggie Chartrand.

Also, a splinter

group of the RIN formed the Regroupment national, lead by René
Jutras, a physician who felt that the RIN was being won over
to Communism.

Jutras emphasized the old Quebec values of the

Catholic Church and the family.
In the 1966 elections there were three separatist
parties: the RIN, the Parti socialiste du Quebec, and the RN.
The RN had resulted from a merger of René Jutras Regroupement
national and a group of dissident members of the provincial
wing of the Creditiste Party - which had in turn split away
from the national Social Credit Party.

The Creditistes were

led by Laurent Legault who acted as co-chairman of the RN
along with Jutras.

The RN was largely rural and conservative

while the RIN, like the Liberal Party, was centered in Montreal
and other urban districts.

While the separatist parties
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received 10 percent of the vote among themselves, they re
ceived no seats, symbolic of the fact that the separatist
movement was ineffective because of its lack of unity.

The

separatist movement in the early 1960s was lacking in unity
of policies and leaders.

Rene LeVesque united these diverse

elements by 1968 under the Parti Québécois.
Creation of the Parti Québécois
It, was during the latter part of the 1960s that the
Parti Québécois would find its roots.

In 1964, a political

observer of Quebec politics wrote that one essential ingredi^
ent which the separatist movement lacked was that of a
charismatic leader.

Rene LeVesque has filled this void.

A popular news commentator, René LeVesque first entered poli
tics in 1960 when he ran for the Quebec provincial legislature
as a candidate of the Liberal Party,

Levesque won the elec

tion and was named Minister of Public Works and Hydraulic
Resources.

It was in this post that Levesque proved to be

a major force behind Quebec's nationalization of its electric
companies.

LeVesque openly called for the separation of Quebec
from the Canadian federation in 1967.

According to his plan

Quebec and the remainder of Canada would split and then Re
unite in a common market, thus English and French Canadians
^^William E. Griffith, "Quebec in Revolt," Foreign
Affairs, October 1964, p. 35.
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would each be governed as they wish while preserving the
prosperity of each within North America.
Levesque believed that the separatist movement in
Quebec resulted from cultural considerations and that the
French Canadian would only survive if Quebec had complete
sovereignty.

The Liberal Party, however, would not accept

Levesque's thesis and therefore he resigned on October 14,
1967.

One month later, along with Gerard Belanger, Levesque

formed a separatist pressure group called the Movement
souverainete - association (MSA).
In April of 1968, the MSA held a convention in which
one thousand of its 7,500 members attended.

During the

course of the convention 1,145 new members joined.

It de

cided that its political plan for separation would focus on
the establishment of an independent Quebec through friendly
negotiations with Ottawa.

It pointed to the precedents of

the separation of Norway from Sweden, Hungary from Austria,
Pakistan from India, and Ireland from Great Britain.

Accord

ing to its plan, the state would have control of all the
means of education, communications, and information.

French

would be the only official language and the language of work
in Quebec.

The economic plan looked forward to a state in

which the government was seen as the prime mover of the
economy.

Private industry would be allowed to continue but

would be strongly regulated.
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By May of 1968, the MSA claimed to have 10,073 duespaying members.

In order to consolidate the power of the

separatist movement the MSA negotiated with the other main
separatist groups: the RN and RIN.
The RIN, with 13,000 members, disagreed with the MSA
on a major point; the status of English-speaking Quebecers.
The RIN believed that Quebec should be unilingual and that
there should be no governmental support given to English
schools.

Rene' LeVesque and the MSA, on the other hand,

thought English schools should continue to receive aid.
These negotiations were abruptly broken off June 24, 1968.
Pierre Bourgault, leader of the RIN, had called for a demon
stration against Prime Minister Trudeau.

The demonstration

got out of hand and ended in a bloody five-hour riot.

There

fore the MSA broke off the negotiations.
In August of that same year negotiations resumed be
twe e n t h e M S A , t h e R I N , a n d a l s o t h e R N .

The RIN still de

manded the establishment of an unilingual Quebec and thus
withdrew from the negotiations over this issue.

The

Ralliement national was a rural-based group described as a
populist movement.

Their leader, Gilles Gregoire, claimed

to have 23,000 members but only 4,665 members could be found
at the time of the convention.

The MSA, however, had grown

to 15,546 members.
On October 14, 1968, the convention ended with the
formation of a new party, the Parti Québécois.

The only
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major change made was that the Bank of Quebec would super
vise banking and credit instead of the Bank of Canada in
cooperation with Canada in order to satisfy former members
of the RN.

Rene Levesque was elected president with Gilles

Gregorie as vice-president.

Within a week the leaders of

the RIN suggested that it should dissolve itself and join
the PQ as individuals, which it did.
The PQ seems to have provided the separatist move
ment with an effective political party organization.

Some

observers believe, however, that if the citizens of Quebec
would reject a referendum on separation, the Parti Québécois
would disassemble.

One author states: "One may suspect that

the PQ, perceived as a gathering of people sharing a specific
political goal without necessarily agreeing on basic ideolical
points, will have problems of survival if ever the indepen72
dence option meets with failure."

Thus, some observers

feel that the political realignment in Quebec is not over.
1970 Election

"In 1970, Quebec's traditional two-party system was
superseded by a multi-party system as two parties obtained
significant proportions of the popular vote,"
political observer.
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writes one

Those two parties were the Parti

^^Raymond Hudon, "The 1976 Quebec Election," Queen's
Quarterly, Spring 1977, p. 29.
^^vincent Lemieux, "The Provincial Party System in
Quebec," in Quebec Society and Politics: Views from the In
side , ed. Dale C. Thomson (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart
Limited, 1973), p. 119.
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Québécois and the Ralliement Creditiste.

(See Table 2).

Only

six years later the Parti Québécois would capture enough sup
port to gain control of Quebec's provincial government.
The Union Nationale, under the leadership of JeanJacques Bertrand, had controlled Quebec since 1966 when it
had defeated the Liberal government of Jean Lesage.

During

that election, separatist parties had managed to gather 9 per
cent of the vote.
Premier Bertrand set the tone of the 1970 election
when he announced that the election would be considered
"partly as a referendum" on Quebec's role in the Canadian
federation.

On this issue, the Parti Québécois believed

Quebec should separate, the Union Nationale said perhaps but
not yet, and the Liberal Party thought that Quebec should
remain in the federation, since it felt independence would
mean economic disaster.
The PQ's popular support in the 1970 election rose
to 23 percent from 6 percent in the 1966 elections, quite a
sizable gain.

Some observers, however, question the validity

of these results in relation to gauging the true strength of
support for the PQ's call for independence.

According to one

author: "Strangely enough, many of those who stated that they
planned to vote for the PQ did not approve of separation: 15.4
percent agreed with separation, 46.2 percent more or less
agreed, 30.8 percent disagreed and 7.7 percent gave no reply

^^Hagy, op. cit., p. 267.
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TABLE 2
THE RESULTS OF THE 1966 AND 1970 PROVINCIAL
ELECTIONS IN QUEBEC
1966

1970

Liberal Party

47

45

Union Nationale

41

20

R.I.N.('66)-Parti Québécois('70)

6

23

R.N,('66)-Ralliement Creditiste('70)

3

11

Others

3

1

Liberal Party

50

72

Union Nationale

56

17

NUMBER OF SEATS

R.I.N.('66)-Parti Québécois('70)

7

R.N.('66)-Ralliement Creditiste('70)
Others

•

12

2

Source: "The Ongoing Political Realignments in Quebec," in
Quebec Society and Politics: Views from the Inside,
ed. Dale C. Thomson (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart
Limited, 1973), p. 120.
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in a survey conducted by the Montreal Star."
Although the PQ gained 2 3 percent of the popular vote,
it only received seven seats in the National Assembly while
the Union Nationale, which received 20 percent of the popular
vote, gained 16 seats.

Why this lack of seats for the PQ?

As a result of Section 80 of the B.N.A. Act, many Englishspeaking counties in Quebec are protected.

In other words,

smaller rural districts have more electing power than larger
urban districts.

As a result, while the Liberal party won

67 percent of the seats, it only received 45 percent of the
popular vote.
Although the Liberals won the election, they were
placed in a position of having to live up to their promises
or face defeat.

According to one author:

The separatists in 1966 had elected no members. In
1970 the Parti Québécois sent seven deputies to the
National Assembly. With their popular vote, the
separatists were the second in 36 other counties,
although in 13 of these they were a weak alterna
tive. Had the near-victories in the other 23
counties been victories, the PQ would have elected
30 members. In each of these ridings, they lost
to Liberals and thus -the Liberal representation
would have been reduced to 49. In every case
where the PQ placed second, except Rouyn-Noranda,
they lost to Liberals. Therefore if the Liberals
do not live up to their promises, the PQ will be
quite likely to capitalize on their mistakes.76

^^Ibid. , p. 270.
T^Ibid., p. 272.
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1976 Election
The elections of 1976 were to prove quite different
from those of 1970.

What accounted for this change?

First, there was a lack of support for Liberals as
shown by polls taken prior to the election.

An April poll

by the Centre de recherches sur l'opinion publique (CROP)
showed the PQ with 41 percent of the popular support, leading
the Liberals with 28 percent.

The Liberals immediately re

plied by publishing the results of another survey, conducted
by the Institut québécois de l'opinion publique (IQOP),
showing that the PQ was trailing the Liberals 43 to 38 percent.
To clarify this discrepancy. La Presse ordered a Gallup Poll
in May, which confirmed the-large lead of the PQ (44 percent
to 33 percent).
The Liberal party itself was responsible for the rise
of discontent.

Many of its members, at one level or another,

were found to be implicated in scandals and corrupt activities.
Second, the economic situation was worsening.

The rate

of unemployment rose to its highest level since World War Two.
One political analyst states: "This factor worked against the
Liberal government especially as it claimed to be the best one,
under Bourassa's leadership, to cope with Quebec's economic
77
difficulties."

Charges of poor management were leveled against

the Liberal administration in the handling of the Olympic
77
Hudon, op. cit.; p. 20.
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installations and of the James Bay hydroelectric development.
Third was the prominence of social tensions within
Quebec.

The controversial language act, Bill 22, left Eng

lish Quebecers with the feeling of betrayal.

It declared

French the official language of Quebec, but at many points
indicated where English could be used, at the discretion of

some authority or other.

It is the vagueness of these discre

tionary powers that upset many in minority groups.

The bill

established French to be the language of instruction, but
school boards can provide instruction in English with the
approval of the Education Minister.

However, for a pupil

to be enrolled in an English language class, he must have
"sufficient knowledge" of that language first--otherwise
the student starts out in French.
The recent dispute between the federal government
and air traffic controllers and pilots posed once again the
question of the status of the French language in Canada.
The federal government's reductions by 20 percent of the
production quotas of milk producers also produced discontent
in Quebec's rural areas.
It has been suggested that.
In fact, there were in Quebec 'two different elec
toral campaigns' in October and November 1976. The
outcome shows that the PQ benefited most from the
political situation just described. However, at
the level of the electorate, the reaction was ex
pressed in two different ways. While Bill 22 and
the necessity of stopping the PQ represented the
most important issue for the Anglophones, the
Francophones were more concerned about the bad
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economic situation and the weakness of Bourassa's
leadership. This was apparent in the electoral
choices: the PQ became the major party for the
Francophones while Anglophones continued to
elect mainly Liberals, while switching for a
significant part to the Union Nationale rU.N.),
thereby electing a few U.N. c a n d i d a t e s . 78
One magazine reported: "The major reason behind the PQ triumph
was the six and one half years often inept and inefficient
Liberal Party rule."
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Comments such as this reveal a shadow

of doubt in the minds of writers on the true support for inde
pendence advocated by the Parti Québécois.

However, before

drawing any conclusions on the likelihood of the PQ's success,
a look at its party programs will be helpful in this analysis.
The assumption is made here that the probability of the PQ's
success will depend on how well the PQ can present its case to
the citizens of Quebec, which is the purpose of their party
program.
78

°Ibid., pp. 20-21.

7Q

K. M. Chrysler, "Tragedy of the Two Canadas," U.S.
News and World Report, December 13, 1978, p. 48.

CHAPTER IV
PROGRAM OF THE PARTI QUEBECOIS
Four centuries of common history have formed French
Quebecers into a nation, which has always contained
in its bosom a large minority of people from a vari
ety of backgrounds, whose basic rights it has re
spected more than most other nations. This founding
people has always manifested the desire to develop
its own, distinctive culture. But it has become ob
vious, with time, that this objective can only be
achieved if it has full control over the reins of
its political l i f e . 8 0
This passage introduces the official program of the
Parti Québécois, adopted at the 6th National Convention held
in Montreal May 27-29, 1977.

Today, in the Federal Parlia

ment, Quebec has only 74 out of a total of 264 members and at
most federal-provincial conferences, Quebec finds itself at
odds with the other ten governments.

It is precisely this

situation which the Parti Québécois seeks to change.

The PQ,

tired of French Canadians occupying a minority position vis-a
vis the English-speaking Canadians, has called for the politi
cal independence of Quebec.

In its view, federalism has only

proven to work against Quebec's best interests.
Political Separation
The first plank of the Parti Québécois program calls
SOofficial Program of the Parti Québécois, 1978 Edi
tion, May 27-29, 1977, p. 7.
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for political sovereignty for Quebec to be achieved through
democratic means; i.e., a referendum.

The Parti Québécois

bases its belief of the right of Quebec to self-determination
on Canada's membership in the United Nations and commitment
to the U.N. Charter, which recognizes the right of all peoples
to self-determination.
Achieving Independence

The Parti Québécois has always maintained that it in
tends to achieve independence through democratic means while
respecting the rights of its neighbors.

The PQ has promised

to hold a referendum concerning independence sometime

during

its first term in office, when it judges it most opportune.
If Quebec citizens support political independence, based upon
a referendum to that effect, the PQ would propose to the
National Assembly a law authorizing it to request from Ottawa
the repatriation of all powers, except those which both gov
ernments will jointly agree to entrust to a joint commission
for the purpose of economic association.

The PQ would enter

into technical discussions with Ottawa on the orderly trans
fer of powers.

If Ottawa should refuse to enter into such

negotiations, Quebec would, "Systematically exercise all of
the powers of a sovereign state in the event that it should
81
have to act unilaterally,"
according to the PQ program.

^^Official Program of the Parti Québécois, 1978 Edi
tion., p. 7.
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During the remainder of the present political regime,
the PQ would promote Quebec's independence as much as possible.
This would include obtaining recognition for Quebec by other
states and requesting admission to the United Nations.
would submit to the Quebec

The PQ

people a national constitution

drawn up by citizens at the county level and adopted by their
representatives at a constituent assembly.

Economic Union
/
The Parti Québécois has called for an economic asso
ciation between Quebec and the remainder of Canada in order
to assure the financial security for both parties.
Levesque writes:

Rene

. . there is no reason why we, as future

neighbors, should not conform to the second great trend of
our times; the new economic groups, customs unions, common
82
markets, etc.''

The proposed economic association would

include the coordination of fiscal policies between an inde
pendent Quebec and the remainder of Canada.
The PQ prefers this arrangement because of the high
degree of economic integration which presently exists be
tween Quebec and Canada.

It also believes that such an

association would not compromise Quebec's political indepen
dence since both governments would be dealing from positions
of sovereignty instead of the current majority-minority status
of English and French-speaking Canadians.
Although the PQ believes an economic association would
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make things easier for both Quebec and the remainder of
Canada, it does not think it is absolutely necessary for
the survival of an independent Quebec.

This position is

not surprising since the PQ would not want to base the
feasibility of its survival as a free country on the con
sent of Canada to an economic union.
According to its program, the PQ would:
1. Recognize to what extent Quebec's economy is
integrated with Canada's (and, especially,
with Ontario's) and the mutual benefits to be
gained by maintaining the free circulation of
goods between these two markets. This would
entail a renunciation, by both sides, of the
idea of creating tariff barriers between the
two trading partners, and the establishment
of a special system for agicultuural products.
2. Discuss and conclude a customs union treaty
formalizing this reciprocal agreement, if
such is the desire of the parties involved,
and harmonize and co-ordinate Quebec's insti
tutions and economic policies with those of
both but, at the same time, protect Quebec's
interests.83
Rene Levesque writes: "Such an association seems to us, in
fact, made to measure for the purpose of allowing us, unfettered
by obsolete constitutional forms, to pool our stakes with what
ever permanent consultation and flexible adjustments would
84
serve our common economic interests. . . ."

^^Rene Levesque, An Option for Quebec (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1968), p. 28.
83
y
/
Official Program of the Parti Québécois, op. cit.,
p. 25.
^"^Levesque, op. cit., p. 29.
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Economic Policy

According to the PQ, Quebec's economy is on the de
cline because of the domination of foreign companies.

It

believes that for all intents and purposes, there are virtually
no francophones in the key decision-making positions, thus
Quebecers have little to say in how their economy is run.

For

the most part, French-speaking Canadians occupy only salaried
and lower levels of the work scale in Quebec.

Therefore, the

PQ would repatriate the main decision-making centers, primarily
with the help of public and cooperative enterprise.

Public

authorities would be given additional resources, such as ex
tensive financial backing, a means of economic intervention,
an economic development plan, and controls on foreign invest
ment and the financial system.
Quebec's economic policy would be based on human and
social considerations by establishing an economic system that
eliminates all forms of worker exploitation and meets the
real needs of all the Quebec

citizens rather than the de

mands of a privileged economic minority.

The PQ would see

that the economy is run more democratically by encouraging
collective forms of organization and guaranteeing worker par
ticipation in the decision-making process.

All citizens

would be ensured a minimum income, and health, housing, edu
cation, work, and justice would be considered as basic rights
to all.

Social progress would be considered more important

than economic progress.
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According to the PQ, Quebecers are the most heavilytaxed people in all of Canada, mainly because of the costly
duplication of the many services inherent to the federal
system.

Rene Levesque writes:

The two levels of government, which each collect
about the same amount of taxes, operate in more
or less the same areas - mainly because the fed
eral government is constantly trying to butt into
Quebec's jurisdictional area, but also because
Quebec finds it necessary to duplicate federal
services in order to promote the interests of
Quebecers which otherwise would be abandoned or
looked down on by Ottawa.85
The duplication of the tax system also creates further compli
cations. Since taxpayers are no longer able to judge the equity
of the system, they no longer know if the services they are
receiving correspond to their share of the tax burden.
This theme of waste as a result of duplication inherent
in federal systems runs throughout the program of the Parti
Québécois.

More importantly, the PQ thinks the services which

the federal government does provide to Quebec are not in Que
bec's interest.

Therefore, the PQ wants to repatriate all tax

revenues presently collected from Quebecers by Ottawa and
provide Quebec citizens with all the services currently sup
plied by Ottawa.

By this method, Quebecers would be assured

of their taxes being allocated according to their best inter
ests.

^^Official Program of the Parti Québécois, op. cit..
p. 17.
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Bus iness
The Parti Québécois thinks that it must occupy a
greater role in regulating the Quebec economy.

One measure

which is of great concern to outside investors, and thus is
very important for future economic investment, and the eco
nomic viability of an independent Quebec, is the creation of
an investment code to govern companies whose shares are held
by nonresidents.

Within the limits of the code, the PQ would

encourage foreign investment in the Quebec economy by develop
ing as many sources of foreign capital as possible by dis
tinguishing three categories of investment in keeping with
the economic sectors that are affected.
The

first category would exclude any foreign partici

pation in what are considered vital sectors;

for example,

cultural affairs, radio and television, publishing, or in the
industrial sectors in which company activities should be re
stricted in keeping with the public interest--for example,
iron ore mining.
The second category would allow foreign participation
on a minority scale (less than 49 percent), although this
percentage could vary according to the area when the produc
tion, the technical staff available, and the expertise re
quired permit the creation of groups of whom a majority are
Quebecers.
The third division would allow foreign participation
on a majority scale (up to 99 percent) in sectors that have
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no real influence on the direction of the economy: sectors
that are largely dependent on external markets for selling
their products and in which Quebec does not occupy a com
petitive position, and sectors in which technology is used
that Quebec does not have.

Dividends paid by companies con

trolled mainly by foreign interests would not be allowed to
amount to more than half of the profits after taxes earned
in Quebec.

The majority of workers of such companies would

also be required to be Quebecers.

Such companies would be

granted a reasonable delay in order to conform to these
regulations.
Any transaction that would place a company in the
hands of foreign interests would have to secure permission
from the Council of Ministers.

The Society of Industrial

Reorganization would take over any profit-making company
that would close or move out of Quebec,

If the workers

thought such a move to be advisable, they could buy back
the company.

Any intervention by the Society for Industrial

Reorganization would aim at putting an end to what the PQ
calls emotional blackmail too often used against workers of
governments.
The Parti Québécois acknowledges that Quebec has
serious economic problems.

It holds these, however, to be

a result of the state's inability to create a coherent de
velopment program because of the inefficiency caused by the
division of state powers between two levels of government.
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According to the PQ, Ottawa and Quebec often pursue differ
ent objectives or cancel each other's efforts by lapsing
into insoluble jurisdictional disputes.

In order to solve

these problems, Quebec must decide for itself what courses
of action to follow to ensure its best interests.
Cultural Policy
The issue of cultural maintenance is one of the main
concerns of the Parti Québécois.

According to the PQ's pro

gram: "Education and culture, the tools of man's liberation,
are a basic prerequisite for human government - an important
factor in any society's social and economic development."^^
Some measures which have already been taken by the PQ pro
vincial government have caused great controversy; for
example, its language Bill 101.
Language
According to the Parti Québécois:
In most countries, companies operate in the language
of the majority and immigrants naturally become in
tegrated with the linguistic group of the majority which occupies most of the important positions in
the society. In comparison to these countries,
Quebec looks more like a colony: francophones who
have the same amount of education as anglophones
clearly occupy more than their fair share of lowincome jobs; conversely, anglophones have more than
the lion's share of important positions, and have
traditionally demonstrated a presence dispropor
tionate to their numbers in advertising, newspapers.

Ibid., p. 18.
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radio, and television - thus contributing to the
anglicization of Quebecers. In nine cases out of
ten, immigrants have integrated into the Englishspeaking group.87
Members of the Parti Québécois fear that if such a process
continues, francophones will become a minority in Montreal
within a generation.
Therefore, the PQ has called for measures that will
ensure the superiority of the French language.

One measure

would make French the only official language of Quebec.

At

the end of a five-year transition period, French would be
the only language of the State, its public bodies, and insti
tutions.
Other measures include the requirement that all con
tracts between individuals, as well as companies, be drawn
up in French unless all parties involved express the desire
to use another language, and the use of French in all de
liberative assemblies and minutes of meetings, except for
ethnic groups of a cultural nature.

Company names in Quebec

would have to be French, along with public and private signs.
Efforts would be made to ensure that streets and squares are
given French names with the exception of a few cases of
historic significance, and that all labels, directions, and
printed or engraved signs be made French.

French would also

be the language of internal communications, negotiations, and
collective agreements in all companies operating in Quebec.

G^lbid., p. 41.
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Under the threat of heavy sanctions and the obligation
to compensate for any harm caused, employers would be pro
hibited from refusing, without cause, to hire employees who
only spoke French, or to dismiss employees because they only
know French.

The use of a foreign language would be re

stricted to specific needs; for example, tourism, foreign trade,
and employers would be required to provide proof of the need to
use a foreign language.

All Quebecers would be guaranteed the

right to be served in French.

Persons providing goods and ser

vices would first be required to address clients in French.
The anglophone minority would be provided with English
language education at all levels subject to the following pro
visions: The Ministry of Education could grant Englishlanguage institutions to the anglophone minority, provided
that teaching in such institutions was carried out partly in
French and that all pupils or students demonstrated a suitable
knowledge of the French language and Quebec culture in relation
to their intellectual development.

Access to English-language

institutions would be restricted to children attending such
institutions at the time the language law went into effect,
their brothers and sisters, the descendants of citizens who
had conducted their elementary school studies in English in
Quebec, or were doing so at the present time.
All new immigrants,, regardless of their mother tongue,
would attend French schools and foreigners who came to Quebec
to study would only be admitted to English-language institutions
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if they were prepared to assume all of the teaching and ad
ministrative costs.
Through such measures as these proposals ensuring
the supremacy of the French language, the PQ hopes to stem
the tide of language assimilation and to establish French as
the working language of Quebec.

The Political System
President
The Parti Québécois would establish a republican gov
ernment with a presidential system.

The president would act

as both chief of state and as head of the government.

Election

would be by direct universal suffrage for a four-year term and
the president's mandate could only be renewed once.

In case of

death, incapacity, or resignation, he would be replaced by a
vice-president who would be elected at the same time as the
près ident.
Presidential powers would include: naming the ministers
and secretaries of State, who could not also be members of
Parliament at the same time, suggesting to the National Assembly
nominations for Supreme Court Justices, and the power of veto.
The veto power, however, could be rendered null and void if the
laws were adopted on second reading in the National Assembly by
a two-thirds majority vote.
right of reprieve.

The president would also have the
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National Assembly
The National Assembly, also to be elected by direct
universal suffrage, would vote the budget and all credits,
exercise control over the executive, convene and question
ministers and secretaries of State, establish a system of
permanent, specialized parliamentary commissions, and vote
on all bills, including bills coming from the executive.
The National Assembly would have the power to override the
president's veto by a two-thirds majority vote.

It would also

have the power to revoke (impeach) the president, requiring a
three-quarters majority vote.
The PQ also pledges to pass a general law on référen
dums which would ensure that the options offered would be
clear and unequivocal, and would be formulated in such a way
as to allow for a true choice.
Citizenship
When Quebec declares independence, says the PQ, it
will recognize as Quebecers all Canadian citizens residing
in Quebec, including new Canadians.

Landed immigrants would

follow the normal procedures for obtaining citizenship, under
the Quebec regime, and any rights they had acquired would be
respected in keeping with the immigration laws in effect when
Quebec attained sovereignty.
Public Administration
With the attainment of independence, the government of
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Quebec would have to deal with new responsibilities which, up
until this time, have been handled by the federal government.
One such area is that of an efficient public administration.
One criticism of the political independence option for Quebec
has been that if Quebec were to leave the Canadian federation,
many of the English Canadians now occupying top positions in
Quebec's managerial and administrative levels would leave,
thus leaving Quebec in a difficult position.

In order to

ensure an amount of continuity, at least in governmental ad
ministrative positions, the PQ says it will integrate federal
employees and civil servants residing in Quebec, who so desire,
into Quebec's civil service without any loss of financial
benfits; their salary range would remain unchanged and any
pension and retirement funds, as well as the contributions
paid by the employer would be transferred to Quebec through
negotiations with the Canadian government.

All fringe bene

fits acquired would be retained and, if necessary, an in
demnity would be paid to cover moving expenses.

Thus the

PQ hopes to persuade some of the present federal civil ser
vice employees to continue their work for an independent state
of Quebec.
Foreign Policy

An independent Quebec would have no intention of shut
ting itself off from the world and retreating to within its
borders; rather, it would participate fully in international

85
life.

According to the PQ program, Quebec's foreign policy

would rest on these basic principles: safeguarding the in
terests of the Quebec people, peace, collective security,
the necessary interdependence of peoples, recognizing the
value of the economic and sociocultural contributions of
other states, and the solidarity of the Quebec people with
the developing nations.
Therefore, the PQ pledges to promote the freedom of
nations and respect for their national character (which is
what the PQ is demanding for Quebec) as well as interna
tional cooperation.

It would also reject all forms of neo

colonialism by keeping an eye on investments and the conduct
of Quebec business abroad.

The PQ would refuse to support

regimes that do not respect the United Nations Charter on
Human Rights and respect the principle of noninterference
in the domestic affairs of another state.
A free Quebec would seek to establish friendly rela
tions with the international community and consider as
priorities the replacement of preferential ties with the
Commonwealth by close relations with francophone countries,
the establishment of close relations with the Third World
countries, especially with Latin America, and the maintenance
of close ties with Canada and the United States.
The PQ would practice a peaceful foreign policy based
on rejection of the use of war to solve international disputes.
Therefore an independent Quebec would advocate disarmament, the
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banning of nuclear tests, the use of nuclear arms and germ
warfare, and the réévaluation of military alliances in light
of these principles.

Military spending would be substantially

reduced, replacing traditional armed forces with territorial
defense units which could also be used for non-military pur
poses such as fire-fighting, and could collaborate with the
United Nations in a peace^keeping capacity.
Finally, the PQ would create a research and surveil
lance unit, which would be under the control of the National
Assembly, whose purpose would be to prevent political inter
ference of multinational companies in the State of Quebec.
Thus the PQ wants to ensure that Quebecers will have full con
trol over their affairs.

International Consequences
An independent Quebec would entail serious interna
tional consequences and therefore the PQ had assured its
neighbors, especially the United States, that it would not
threaten their security.

According to its program, the PQ

says it will respect those treaties binding Quebec and Canada
which are favorable to Quebec and revoke others in accordance
with the rules of international law.
Territorially, Quebec would claim all of its territory
including Labrador and the islands off the New Quebec coast,
the continental shelf, the 200-mile coastal limit, the socalled "federal" parks and the Quebec part of the area around
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the national capital.

It would also reclaim as Quebec terri

tory the Artie islands and territories that presently belong
to Canada by virtue of the same title as other Nordic coun
tries.

If no agreement can be reached on these questions,

the PQ says it will occupy these areas through legal means
(granting concessions, setting up institutions, etc.) and
then taking the case to the International Court of Justice.
Critique of PQ Program

The Parti Québécois has been criticized by antiseparatists both within and outside Quebec for advocating
political independence while not having detailed the means
by which Quebec would survive if it were independent.
answer to such criticism one PQ member responds:

In

"In the

beginning, we must be content to establish a solid general
outline for the required structure, without losing ourselves
in the details of short-term or piecemeal economics, the
factor always picked-on by the timid when they want to
frighten themselves, and.by the 'others' when they want to
frighten us."^^

Rene Levesque agrees, claiming that these

objections are raised in an attempt to confuse the issue of
independence, calling them scare tactics while acknowledging
that the "take-off" (independence) is a gamble.
However, predictions of economic doom, should Quebec
SSBernard Chenot, "A New Canadian Union," in An Op tion for Quebec, Rene Levesque (Toronto; McClelland and
Stewart Limited, 1968), p. 32.
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leave the Canadian federation, still cast a shadow of gloom
over the option of political independence.
states;

One observer

"The separation of Quebec from the rest of Canada

would leave the Québécois in misery, poverty, and unemploy
ment."^®

He points out that approximately 35 percent of the

burden paid to the provinces of Canada are given to Quebec
while Quebecers contribute only 25 percent of these payments.
Thus he concludes that the economic cost of separation for
Quebec would be prohibitive.
The PQ says it will seek the establishment of an eco
nomic union with the remainder of Canada.
of Canada agree to such an arrangement?

But would the rest
Some observers, mainly

English-speaking, do not think so, because of the ill feelings
which are sure to accompany a breakup of the Canadian federa
tion.

Others point out that neither Quebec nor the rest of

Canada would give the other party veto power on tariff poli
cies and trading arrangements with other foreign nations.®^
According to the PQ, neither side would like to see
the loss of the other's market.

Quebec would not want to lose

the large Canadian market nor would Canada want to lose its
access to the Quebec market.

Quebec purchases two dollars of

goods from English Canada for every one dollar of goods that

^^Jean Provencher, Rene LeVesque, Portrait d'un
québécois (Ottawa: Les Editions La Presse, 1973), p. 241.
^'^Bruce Hutchison, "Canada's Troubles," Foreign
Affairs, October 1977, p. 180.
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Quebec sells to English Canada.

Therefore, the Parti

Québécois foresees little difficulty in obtaining Canada's
acceptance for the proposed economic association once po
litical separation becomes a fact.

One observer writes:

"Indeed, the probability of that event [political separa
tion] may depend to an important degree on the likelihood
that a Quebec-Canada customs union can be established, or
at least to the degree that the Parti Québécois can convince
the Quebec electorate that it can be established."^^
Referendum
When the PQ first came to power, it promised to hold
a referendum on political independence within two years, but
it has postponed the date to a time closer to the end of its
five-year mandate.

Asked to comment on Levesque's decision,

Prime Minister Trudeau replied: "I suppose he is beginning
to realize that it is going to be a tougher and longer pro
cess than he had bargained for to convince Quebecers to vote
for independence, and I suppose that confirms my view that
Quebecers will not be easily moved, to vote for independence. . . ."

q2

Mr. LeVesque has said that he foresees a long prereferendum campaign, which in fact has already started.
M. Treddenick, "Quebec and Canada: Some Economic
Aspects of Independence," Journal of Canadian Studies,
December 1973, p. 16.
^^Canada Weekly, February 9, 1977, p. 8.
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When asked why the PQ is going to wait, he replied:
To give you a simple part of the answer, we have
not yet devised the rules for holding a referen
dum on a Quebec-wide level. We're working right
now on basic referendum legislation.
Even more important, perhaps, we have not
yet had a chance to spell out the economic and
other aspects of the Quebec situation. That takes
some time. We've just started to tell our side of
the story.93

The proposed referendum has been the subject of great
concern.

Some observers claim that the Liberal government was

responsible for its own defeat in 1976 because of its misman
agement of affairs.

Because of the PQ's promise to hold a

referendum on the question of separation, many non-separatists
were enabled to vote for the Parti Québécois to register their
protest against a corrupt Liberal government, while still per
mitting these same voters to veto the option of political in
dependence when such a referendum would be held.

Therefore,

some political observers believe that the proposed referendum
allowed the PQ to capture support in its election victory in
1976 that it would otherwise have not received, but that this
element will not necessarily support the PQ's quest for inde
pendence.
The wording of the referendum itself has become a
source of contention.

Those opposed to Quebec independence

fear that the referendum will be worded in such a way that it
will be misleading, that it will not offer a clear-cut choice.

^^Quebec en Bref, "Monsieur Levesque desire une vraie
Confederation," December 1977, p. 2.
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and thus will not reflect the true support for separatism
among Quebecers.

There has been discussion of the federal

government holding its own national referendum on the ques
tion of national unity.

This would allow the federal govern

ment to decide on the wording of the referendum and possibly
rob the separatist movement of its momentum if such a refer
endum were to result in the rejection of the separatist op
tion.
Important for the Parti Québécois is the apparent
acceptance by the federal government of recognizing the
opinions of the Quebec citizenry.

Prime Minister Trudeau

has stated that if indeed the citizens of Quebec do vote in
favor of separation by a significant amount, negotiations
between the federal and Quebec governments will follow.

Al

though Prime Minister Trudeau does not believe in separation
as an acceptable alternative, he does admit that "all is
negotiable" as far as the Canadian constitution is concerned.
These negotiations, according to Trudeau's plans, while not
leading to political separation, would involve revamping the
Canadian federation to ensure the cultural rights of the
French Canadian.
Levesque, on the other hand, unequivocally refuses to
engage in negotiations concerning the current federal frame
work of Canada because he no longer believes in the ability
of the federation to protect Quebec's interests.

LeVesque

has said that perhaps he would enter into discussions that
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seek a profound realignment leading to a new form of Canadian
confederation, but it would be necessary that this structure
be a true association of two sovereign states.
Therefore, prospects for negotiations leading to the
restructuring of the Cannadian federation if the separatist
referendum were to succeed seem to be slim at the present
time.
Conclusion

Running throughout the Parti Québécois program is the
belief that Canada's federal system is obsolete.

The PQ re

peatedly states that the present federal system robs Quebec
of the needed tools to handle its problems.

Rather, feder

alism results in the interference by the federal government
into the affairs of Quebec, as demonstrated by endless
jurisdictional battles and the duplication of services be
tween the federal and Quebec governments.

Many times these

two levels of government pursue different objectives and
therefore their activities sometimes cancel out each other's
efforts.
While the Parti Québécois does not claim that problems
would be easily solved if Quebec were independent, it firmly
believes that its problems cannot be solved by someone else;
namely, the English-dominated federal government.

The Parti

Québécois contends that independence is a precondition to a
solution to Quebec's problems in such a way as to serve the
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best interests of French Canadians.

This is the main point

of the PQ program: French Canadians must have complete con
trol of their destiny; i.e., they must control all decisions
made affecting them, if they are to survive and develop ac
cording to their French culture.

According to the PQ, only

through political independence can French Canadians secure
their continued existence.

Will the people of Quebec be con

vinced by the PQ's argument for independence?

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

The Parti Québécois is seeking to preserve the French
culture of Quebec citizens, a goal of Quebecers ever since
their conquest by the English.

At first, la survivance was

based upon a policy of isolation within Quebec.

Quebecers

only became involved in national politics when they felt their
rights were threatened,

French Canadians learned to take ad

vantage of rights granted them by the British Parliament.

The

Quebec Act of 1774, which placed French Canadians on an equal
political and religious status with English Canadians, and
the Constitutional Act of 1791 which provided French Canadians
with a geographical as well as a political base, are illus
trative of this point.

Although the British government tried

to foster assimilation, Quebecers succeeded in maintaining
their unique way of life.
The establishment of the Canadian federation of 1867
did not change the situation.

Although English and French

Canadians joined together, their motives differed.

English

Canadians sought a means to pursue economic expansion without
interference from the French Canadians.

French Canadians, on

the other hand, wanted to preserve their identity and felt,
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in face of the overwhelming assimulative pressures which con
fronted them from the United States's "melting pot", believed
that membership in the Canadian federation would at least ensure
Quebecers of language and cultural rights which they had already
secured from the British government.
This contrast of motivations for joining the federation
by English and French Canadians has posed problems for the func
tioning of the Canadian political system in the past and certainly
provides an important component in explaining the current strength
of the Quebec separatist movement lead by the Parti Québécois.
In the past this "negative" attitude on the part of Quebec's French
Canadians has prevented their active participation in national
politics.

Although English Canada has been at times frustrated by

the lack of consensus between their positions and that of Quebec,
for example, during the Conscription Crises of World War I and II,
they were not challenged to the extent to which they are today.
Presently, however, the supporters of the Parti Québécois
are not challenging specific policies of the federal government,
but are instead questioning the legitimacy of the Canadian federal
system itself.

French Canadians object to their position as a

"permanent minority" within the federal system.

According to one

author, those advocating Quebec separatism see "...the problem of
French Canada as that of a nation, with a common culture and
language, but lacking the instruments of government necessary to
promote its national aspirations."^^

Thus Quebec separatists seek

^Vlex Macleod, "Nationalism and Social Class: The Unresolved
Dilemma of the Quebec Left," Journal of Canadian Studies, vol. 8.
no. 3, December 1975» P« 15«
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to ensure a "French" solution to their problems.

No longer are

they tolerant of the English-Canadian domination of their lives,
which they feel threatens the continued existence of their
unique way of life.

In the past, French Canadians relied upon

their Catholic Church as protector of their culture.

Today,

that reliance has shifted to Quebec's provincial government.
For the Parti Québécois, the recuperation by the Quebec govern
ment of the major instruments of political decision making is
essential for the establishment of a society where all individ
uals can achieve full self-determination.

It seeks to escape

the frustrating political majority/minority situation in which
French Canadians find themselves.

According to the PQ, Quebec

is so different that its demands cannot be met within the
present Canadian federation, but must be allowed to go completely
its own way.
Will the Parti Québécois succeed in attaining political
independence for Quebec?

Commenting on the possibility of an

independent Quebec, Rene Lévesque writes:
At first sight, this looks like a dramatically rapid
development, this burgeoning and flowering over a
very few years of a political emancipation movement
in a population which, until recently, was commonly
referred to as quiet old Quebec. But in fact, its
success would mean, very simply, the normal healthy
end result
of a long® and laborious national evoluqq
tion.^3
Was the PQ's electoral victory a result of Quebec
95

/
/
Rene Levesque, "For an Independent Quebec," Foreign
Affairs, vol. 54, no. 4, July 1976, p. 735.
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support for separation or was it of dissatisfaction with the
previous Liberal government?

Most observers, including Rene

LeVesque, believe that the PQ election of 1976 was not a man
date by Quebecers for separation.

One writer notes:

Levesque's party won power by soft-pedaling seces
sion and promising good, honest government. Since
then, polls show that only a minority of the Pro
vince's population - 5 million French-speaking
citizens and 1 million Anglophones - has been won
over to the idea of independence.
Even this minority is shrinking. A sampling
in July showed 70 percent opposed to separation
compared with the 62 percent against the idea
last April 1977.96
Rene Levesque promised, during the 1976 campaign, to
hold a referendum on the question of independence.

Because of

this stipulation, some observers have stated that Quebecers
voted for the PQ with the knowledge that they would have the
opportunity to reject the option of political independence,
while still supporting the Parti Québécois.

Therefore not all

PQ supporters were endorsing Quebec separatism in 1976.
The PQ played down its separatist goals and .concen
trated on provincial issues, attacking Liberal Premier Robert
Bourassa's government for Quebec's 10.1 percent unemployment
rate and alleged corruption in government.

In fact, during

the 1976 provincial campaign, only 7 percent of the Quebec
public regarded separation as the prime issue.
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One historian

writes :
^^"Independence for Quebec; The Debate gets Sharper,"
U.S. News and World Report, September 26, 1977, p. 43.
G^Henry S. Albinski, "Currents in Canadian Politics,"
Current History, April 1977, p. 161.

98

Rene LeVesque, leader and founder of the PQ, knew
that those who voted PQ were not necessarily sepa
ratists; a poll taken just before the election re
vealed that only 18 percent of the Quebec electorate
were in favor of separation. LeVesque had not con
centrated on the issue of separatism but had attacked
the Liberal government for its inefficiencies, mis
management, and disregard of the basic social issues
in Quebec; unemployment (10 percent of Quebec's Labor
force compared with an average of 2.6 percent for the
rest of Canada), labor unrest, continual strikes, and
the huge deficit of the provincial government. Thus,
those who voted for responsible government with a
concern for social and economic issues and not pri
marily for separatism.98
Then just how much support for political independence
does the PQ actually have?

According to one political scien

tist: "Clearly, most of the independists are Parti Québécois
supporters, but not all Parti Québécois supporters are inde
pendists. . . . This situation adds to the difficulty of asses
sing the strength and predicting the progress of the indepen99
dist movement."

Exemplary of the confusion over the support

for independence is a poll taken just one week after the elec
tion which showed that only 11 percent of Quebecers favored
separatism.
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Therefore the true strength of separatist support among
Quebecers remains unclear.

Federalists contend that the
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Kenneth M. Glazier, "Separatism and Quebec," Current
History, April 1977, p. 161.
^^Daniel Latouche, "The Independence Option: Ideologi
cal and Empirical Elements," quoted in Quebec Society and Poli
tics: Views from the Inside, ed. Dale C. Thomson (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1973), p. 189.
^^^Kenneth M. Glazier, op. cit., p. 154.
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citizens will not support the separation of Quebec from the
Canadian federation, while the PQ claims they will if they
are sufficiently informed of the merits of independence.

At

this point, no one can say positively which way Quebecers
would vote on an independence referendum.

The answer to this

question must await the outcome of the proposed referendum,
provided that the referendum is worded in a form which pro
vides a clear choice between separation or continued member
ship in the federation.
/

/

As a result, the Parti Québécois is very concerned
about the timing and wording of the independence referendum.
The rejection of the independence option would be a very
serious blow to the continued existence of the PQ.

Levesque

has said if the PQ fails this time, it will try again, until
it accomplishes its goal.
It is improbable that the Parti Québécois would be
able to convince Quebecers to support political separation if
it were to fail in its first effort.

The PQ would be hard

pressed to maintain the various elements which currently con
stitute its support.

Although most members of the PQ seek

political independence, disagreement over the method of attain
ing separation would likely follow the defeat of the proposed
referendum.

The separatist movement, unorganized before the

formation of the PQ, might well fall back into such a state.
English Canada would most likely consider Quebec po
litical separation a dead issue if the people of Quebec were

100
to reject a separatist referendum.

Hopefully they would not

brush the whole affair aside, but would seek some accommoda
tion with French-speaking Canadians of Quebec.

If Quebecers

were to reject the separatist option, the PQ would be robbed
of its momentum.

If the federal government were to follow

through with positive action to improve the economic and cul
tural condition of the French Canadian, it would be very diffi
cult for the PQ to mount another assault on the Canadian fed
eration.
Economic Viability

A major concern of Quebecers pondering the wisdom of
the independence option is that of the economic viability of
an independent Quebec.

According to one reporter:

It's true the PQ can make a strong case for the
economic viability of an independent Quebec. The
province is huge - some 600,000 square miles, bigger
than Alaska. It possesses a large industrial in
frastructure, a wealth of natural resources, vast
hydropower reserves. Its citizens - 27 percent of
Canada's population - produced about 45 billion
dollars worth of goods and services last year.
That output would rank an independent Quebec 23rd
among all the nations of the world.
Yet even with such economic credentials, Que
becers would have to pay a steep price for inde
pendence.101
According to a Canadian professor: "The bourgeois in
clination among French Canadians is stronger than their nationalism.

10 2
They would not give up their life-style for a flag."
^^^Daniel Latouche, op. cit., p. 69.
in?

Raymond Carroll and John Lowell, "Quebec, Oui,"
Newsweek, November 29, 1976, p. 41.
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However, another political•observer does not agree.

He writes:

. , . we can hazard the hypothesis that nationalism
has little intrinsic appeal to classes lower in the
social order, workers or peasants; it appears only
when it is linked with the solution of deeply felt
economic ills, often by the presentations of the
nationalist goal as a messianic solution to all the
social and economic ills. This identification suc
ceeds with the masses in certain conditions, which
are hard to determine exactly, and then nationalism
becomes a mass force. This has not yet happened in
Quebec, although there are signs that it might. If
it does, then Quebec will accede to independence in
a short space of time.103
The primary concern here is with the political aspect
of Quebec separatism and the Parti Québécois and not economics.
However, many political observers of Quebec contend that eco
nomic concerns form a major force behind the current separatist
movement.
It is imperative that the PQ convince Quebecers that
independence would not entail harsh economic burdens.

It must

convince the citizens of Quebec that an independent Quebec will
prosper both culturally and economically.

Although Levesque

has stated that the Quebec separatist movement is a result of
cultural considerations, economics will play a major factor.
Statements emanating from those opposing separation have been
dominated by predictions of doom should Quebec separate.

This

presents a major hurdle for the PQ to surmount if it is going
to convince Quebecers to support separation.

1 n%

Charles Taylor, "Nationalism and the Political In
telligentsia: A Case Study," Queen's Quarterly, vol. 72, no. 1,
Spring 1965, p. 168.
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Analysis of 1976 Victory
According to one political analyst: "A most interest
ing fact, demonstrated once again by the [1976] Quebec election,
is that the level of voter dissatisfaction towards the govern
ment has increasingly become the safest indication of the out
come of electoral contests.He believes that the defeat
of the Union Nationale government in 1970, the spectacular re
election of the Liberals in 1973, and the defeat of the
Bourassa government can thus be explained.

The expression of

this discontent has taken two different directions.

Many

anglophones have switched from the Liberal Party to the Union
Nationale, while francophones have increased their support for
the PQ.

In light of this analysis, the most important question

for the future of the Parti Québécois is whether it will be able
to meet the many expectations which were raised during the 1976
election, including honest government, economic growth, and
social reform.
The results of a referendum for independence may depend
largely upon the performance of the Levesque government.

Since

the Parti Québécois came to power, unemployment has risen and
investment has slowed.

There are reports of businesses and

English-speaking people leaving the province.

Canada's largest

life insurance company. Sun Life Assurance, long one of the

^^^Raymond Hudon, "The 1976 Quebec Election," Queen's
Quarterly, vol. 84, no. 1, Spring 1977, p. 21.
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symbols of Montreal's stature as a business and financial cen
ter, announced January 7, 1978, that it planned to move its
head office to Toronto because of Quebec's language law.

Such

a move could affect more than 1,800 employees and cause an
estimated $40 million loss to the local economy.

The federal

government appealed to Sun Life executives to reconsider the
decision.

The Sun Life board of directors announced that it

would delay a vote on its planned move to Toronto, but in May
of 1978, policyholders voted 84 percent in favor of the move,
which will soon take place.

Some fear that the move will,

. fan the fire of separatism among French Canadians who
already believe, with some justice, that there is little room
for them in English companies.

It would weaken the resistance

of the federalist groups in Quebec who are working to keep the
. J ,,105
country united."
Levesque and his supporters contend that many of the
allegations concerning Quebec's faltering economy are ground
less, that they constitute efforts by anti-separatists to dis
credit the government, and in no way result from Parti Québécois
policies.

The unemployment rate, a $1 billion public debt, and

huge government expenditures, they point out, were all inherited
from Levesque's predecessor, Liberal Party Premier Robert
Bouras sa.
In order to convince the people of Quebec of its ability

^^^Canadian Press Comment, "Sun Life Assurance Company's
Planned Move to Toronto," January 25, 1978, no. 4, p. 1.
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to bring about those goals which it seeks, the PQ must lessen
Quebec's current economic plight.

Although the PQ claims it

has inherited such major problems as high unemployment and a
large public debt, it nonetheless must make progress in these
areas.

Today's problems, no matter what their source, are now

the responsibility of the PQ.

The PQ has stated that Quebecers

are hampered in finding solutions to their problems because of
federal interference.

Quebecers, however, are not likely to

be persuaded to vote for separation if the PQ cannot provide
some evidence of its capability to resolve Quebec's problems.
The PQ's election was not a mandate for separation, but rather
a mandate to improve the welfare of Quebec citizens.

If it is

to succeed in bringing about Quebec independence, the PQ must
demonstrate that it can act effectively as well as convincing
Quebecers of the merits of separation.
Recent polls have shown that only a minority of Que
becers support the Parti Québécois's call for political sepa
ration, somewhere in the neighborhood of 30 percent, although
polls vary.

Thus it is doubtful that if a referendum were held

today, it would receive majority support from Quebecers.

This

is not meant to imply that political separation will not occur
in Quebec, but rather that the Parti Québécois must work to
convince a large part of its citizens of the advantages of in
dependence.

The Parti Québécois must provide more than

rhetoric; it must demonstrate through action its ability in
solving Quebec's problems.
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English Canada has a great influence in shaping the
outcome of the separatist challenge.

Actions such as that

taken by Sun Life Assurance may very well strengthen Quebec
support for the Parti Québécois.

If English Canada demon

strates a lack of faith in the future of the Canadian federa
tion, it will undoubtably help the separatist cause.

If, on

the other hand, it actively seeks to maintain the present
federation, it will be much harder for the PQ to convince
its people to separate.
This brings up the issue of just how far should Eng
lish Canadians go in order to keep the Canadian federation in
tact,

Although most Canadians wish to see their country remain

as it is, some fear that the federal government will make ex
tensive concessions which alter the nature of the Canadian
federation.

They fear that if the Canadian system were altered

by decentralizing the powers of the federal government in order
to satisfy French Canadian separatists, and were Quebec to opt
for independence, the future of the remainder of Canada would
be placed in jeopardy.
Recently there has been developing a feeling among
some English Canadians that the federal government should stop
trying to satisfy French Canadian separatists, who only want
independence, and concentrate on the interests of English
Canada.

Instead of altering the federation, they would rather

see Quebec go free.

Any change in the Canadian federation

should be evaluated from the standpoint of how it would affect
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English Canada.

In essence, their argument is that a free

Quebec would be more desirable than a major alteration of
the federal governmental powers.
The confrontation of nationalistic forces on both
sides would leave little hope for the salvation of the Cana
dian federation.

Prime Minister Trudeau has sought to

placate the demands of the French Canadians through a policy
of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework, thus dis
missing the notion that there are "two nations" within Canada.
He believes that nationalistic forces are reactionary.

In

order to maintain the federation, Prime Minister Trudeau must
check the polarization of nationalistic tendencies of both
French and English Canadians.
The next few years will be a time of adjustment for
Canada and it is necessary that both sides approach the solu
tion to their problems in a realistic and practical frame of
mind.

The separation of Quebec is a possibility of which Eng

lish Canadians should be aware.

French Canadians should also

be aware that continued association in the Canadian federation
is an alternative.

Hopefully the resolution of this issue will

be handled in such a way as to be advantageous to both French
and English Canadians.
As for the Parti Québécois, if they should receive a
mandate for political independence, other issues still remain
to be resolved.

The legality of separation would remain, since

it is not provided for under the BNA Act.

What would be the
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response of the rest of the world to such a development?

What

would be the federal government's response to a declaration of
independence by Quebec?

What adjustments would English Canada

have to make if Quebec were to leave?
Some observers have stated that the PQ might fall
apart once independence were achieved.

Separatists represent

many different perspectives of the political spectrum; they
are only united in the desire for separation.

If political

independence were achieved, the possibility of the formation
of splinter parties would be likely.
The formation of the Parti Québécois has resulted from
demands by French Canadians to ensure the prosperity of their
culture and well being.

It also signifies frustration by some

with the utility of the Canadian federation in solving their
problems.

The Parti Québécois is offering the citizens of

Quebec an alternative political system to deal with their prob
lems.

It remains to be seen if Quebecers will choose this

option.
Although any prediction concerning the success of the
Parti Québécois's attempt to bring about political independence
for Quebec would only be speculative, the outcome of this crisis
will surely leave the Canadian federation a changed system.
Even if Quebec should remain within the federation it is likely
that the federal government will be more decentralized than it
is presently.

In the future this decentralization of the cen

tral government's powers could help result in the dismemberment
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of Canada, a country which has long struggled with its quest
for a national identity.

A weakened federal government would

find it difficult to counter the formation of strong alle
giances to the respective provinces rather than to the na
tional entity of Canada.

Not only could Quebec later decide

to separate but so might other provinces which find themselves
many times at odds with the central government.
It would be ironic if Canada decentralized the powers
of its federal government in an effort to save the federation
only later to find that in doing so it had destroyed the
viability of the very federation it seeks to preserve.

There

fore, not only must French Canadians decide if they are willing
to forego the price of political separation, but Englishspeaking Canadians must also decide how far they are willing
to alter their governmental system to convince Quebecers to
remain.
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